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Civil Liberties and the Dual l egacy o f the Founding
John \V. Compton

In rhc area of civil Liberties, the American framers bequeathed a dual legacy. On
the one hand, they authored and ratified constitutions wirh strikingly open-ended
guarantees concerning the fm:dom of srccch, the freedom of religion, the right ro
trial by jury, and various aspectS of criminal procedure. On the other hand, the
same Americans who spoke of "inalienable" righrs endorsed a range of inherittd
laws and customary practices char shar;>ly limired rhe practical consequences of
these abstr:act guarantees. MOSt of the newly independent states enforced laws
againsr blasphemy, for example, cvci as thdr conStirunons promised to respect
the freedom of speech. Many scares also criminalized Sunday labor and barred
non·Proresranrs from holding office, even as rheir constirutions prohibited
religious establi>hments and promised to respect rhe freedom of religion. And
virrually no one involved in the drafting of the state or federal constitutions
believed rhat civil liberries provisions indicated any change in the legal status of
slaves, women, or orher subordinate classes of Americans.
There can he little doubt that the a uthors of Founding·~:ra rights provisions
sincerely hoped ro protect citizens from the sons of abuS<.'S - from warrantless
searches ro rhc forced quarrering of soldiers - thar had transformed the imperial
ctisi< inro a revolution. Bur most of them were equally dcrermined to guard against
the colla~ of customary forms of authority rhar they dttmed essential ro social
stability. Thus, while civil liberties prinaplcs certainly playtd a a:nttal role in the
American Revolution, it is noc at all dear mar chcy occupied a prccmincnr position
in the constitutional order that emerged in its afterrnarh. Far from elevating civil
liberties above inhcrittd forms of authority, the founding generation superimposed
the former on rhc latrer, leaving it ro future generations to work out the precise
nature of the re.ulting relationships.
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..,-ch, for e"ample - has typically been insufficient to prevail in the courts: In
,ddiuon, rights claimant:s have regularly ~n asked _w overcome a compenng
•of normative commlhnenrs- ro federalism, ro patnarchal family relanons, to
-1iglously inspiml social mores - thar give entrenched authority its own
4iorinct claim to consrirutional kgitimacy. The mOSt obvious practical eff~t
fl dus duality, particularly in the early ytars of the republic, was the frtquenr
_.i,ordmation of civil liberties ro illiberal forms of authority. Yet even as
illiberal aurhority structures bave eroded over time, the framers' dual lcgacy
... conti nued ro shape constitutional d(velopmcnt in ways both subtle and
pcofound.
Indeed, it is noteworthy that even as Americans have adopted ever more
IXP"ll)ive conceptions of particular consritutional liberties, they have cominued
io disagrec, often bitterly, about precisely which forms of inherited auchority are so
arbitrary or oppressive as to run afoul of rhcsc guarantees. 111ey have also
disagreed, just as bitterly, over the srare's proper role in mitigating the social
lllld polirictl effects of illiberal social authority. Should civil liberties provisions
be ttgarckd as purely negative guarantees, offering prorcction against government
.aion only, and thus not incompatible with MJCial arraogement:s that,
while illiberal, arc nor clearly underpinned by official auchority? Alternatively,
do Jl'>vernmcnr actors ha"" an affumatirc duty ro dismantle inherited social
llNCIUttS char render civil liberties aU bur meanin8Jcss foc some citizens? And if
u:h an obligation aists, how does one cakularc (and justify) the resulting
tnidcoffs bctwttn liberty and equality? Lf consensus on these questions has
provtd elusive, ir is ar least in part because the Constitution, owing to irs dual
• ture, cannot settle the matter.
This chapter divides the history of civil liberties into four periods. The first
lection covers the period from the founding through the late nineteenth century - a
cirnc when a broad moral consensus roote<I in Protestant Christianity was said to
demarcate a bow1dary b<.-tween "liberty" and "license" and when open-ended civil
liberties provisions were rarely interpreted in ways that undermined customa ry
pettems of authority. The second section e>eamincs the early decades of the
tMnticth century, a ttansforrnative period whci the collapse of the Proresrant
moral consensus, together with the rise of social movement:s bent on undermining
emrmched hierarchies, left the traditional 1hcory of ovil liberties in ratters.
The chapter's third section documenrs rhe emergence, in the middle decades
of the rwentieth century, of a new rhcory ccnrered on promoting individual
eutonomy and protecting a robust marketplace of ideas. Crucially, the mid·
century Supreme Court harnessed irs civil liberties jurisprudence to an
eplnarian theory of American democracy, aggressively scrutinizing laws char

This chapter will argue that the framers' dual legacy in the arcd of civil

appeared ro perpetuate systemic incqu:.tllty while adoptirtg a defe-rt"nri:il

liberties has cnst a long historical shadow. Since the early republic:, Americans
have invoked consritutional civil liberties provisions to challenge cusromary
forms of a uthority. Yet establishing theabstraer legitimacy ofone's claim- that
it comporrs wirh a particula r concepticon o f religious liberty or the freedom of

epproach in cases where state action seemed designed to mitigate flaws in the
nation's rcprcsenrative system of government.
The chapter's final section covers rhe modern period (1970s to the present}, an
m when the justices have sorted themselves into competing ideological <"'1mps,
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with each camp at times embracing an expansive conception of civil liberties _
albeit for ve.ry different reasons.. fo son:ic ~-ascs, a "liberal" bloc advocating an
uncom~rom1smg approach to ovil hberues 1s pitted against a "conservative" bloc
advocating ~eferencc to trad'.ti?n~l m~res.and local majority sentiment. In others,
the ideological valence of ovd liberties 1s reversed, with the conservative bloc
adopon~ an absolutJSt conception of individual rights and rhe libeml bloc
advocating defer~ce to lawmakers who arc purportedly acting to remedy
structural mcquaht1es. llec;i use case outcomes have often turned on the vote of a
~ingle "swing". jw:rkc, m~c':" civil liberties doetrine has grown increasingly
incoherenr: decisions procl:ummg the inviolabiliiy of civil liberties principles are
followed, often ID the same term, by decisions calling for deference to tradition or
for suhordi~ating ci~il liberties to the goal of fostering a more egalitarian society.
These doctrinal tensions become comprehensible when viewed in the light of the
framers' dual legacy.
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE LONG NINt.Tt.~NTH CENTURY

Ar first glance, it may seem that the individual righ ts today referred to a~ "civil
liberties" have always been a core concern - perhaps the core concern - of
~crican.con~titutionalism. Certainly, no subjcct featured more prominend y
ID the ~anficanon debate of 1787-1788.' Most of the delegates rasked with
evaluanng the Philadelphia Convention's handiwork hailed from states whose
c~nstin~tions recognized a range o f "natural," "ina lienable," or "inherent"'

rights, m~ludin~ the freedom of the press, the freedom of religion, and the
right to tnal by JUI)'. The biU (or declaration) of rights was typically placed at
the head of t.hese documenrs, thus ensuring, at least in theory, that the new state
governments would not '?~ sight of the higher ends for which they were
formed. Tr is hardly surprismg, then, that many delegates cried fo ul when it
was dlSCovcrcd that the proposed federal constitution lacked such protections.
In the end, James Madison and other leading Federalists fearing that the
Constitution might go down to defeat, agreed to amend che document. The
resulrmg guarantees, now known collectively as the Bill of Rights, included
the freedoms ~(.press and speech; the rights of petition a nd assembly; the free
exercise of relig1.on.; a ban on religious establishments; the right to bear arms;
and a range .o f crrmmal procedure guarantees including, among other things, the
right to: fair and speedy trial, a ban on warrandess searches, and a prohibition
aga1Dst cruel and unusua l" pu~ishmenrs.
But for all the ink they spilled in defense of civil liberties it is far from dear
that founding-era America.ns understood these guarantees in the same way as
twenty-first-century Americans. Indeed, many of the same state convenrion
dclegares who demanded a federal bill of righrs were alarmed to find that the
1
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See, for example. PauUoe Maier, Ra#/icatfon: Tht Pimple Debate tllt Constilulion, J ?87-J 7gg
{New York: Simon and Schus1er, 1010).
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Con.iirution explicitly banned the use of religious test oaths for
al officeholders. This provision raised the specter that "pagans, deists,
ometaos" and even the "fX>pe of Rome" might "obtain offices among
,._ • • Although Federalist writers conceded chc force of the objection, rhey
to assure skeptical dcleg;itcs that rhe Constitution would not interfere
Jllilb the stateo' ability to punish "profane swearing, blasphemy ... professed
lllhcism • and other "gross immoralities and impieries."'
What should we make of A'!'cri<"allS who demanded expansively wordc-d rights
puaoteeS while simultaneously insisting that \.atholics be barred from public
dfices and blasphemy punished as a crime? Two broadly shared convictions
llloMd Americans tO proclaim allegiance ro the idea of civil liberties while
lialulraneously embrocing inherited social srn1erurcs that sharply limited the rcalworld effects of these written guarantees. First, ir was widely agtCed that republican
pemmcnt was unlikely to survive in the absence of a morally virtuous citizenry.•
from this it followed that a Prorestant-derivcd moral consensus marked, or ought
ID mark, ~ boundary between liberty and license. Second, e•en as Americans
tailnced the 1..-JCkean language of natural rights, the enduring force of the
cunmon law ensured that they would continue to view their own society in
llroadly hierarchical t.erms. Thus James Kent and other early American legal
_,,,.,.uarors depicted a society composed nor of coequal rights-bearing citizens
bur of legally enforceable relationships featuring dominant and subordinate
panncrs: husbands and wives, masters and servants, guardfans and waids.1 To
the limited extent that these writers addressed the tension between inherited legal
prerogatives and rhc Lockean ideal of universal rights, they insisted that the very
poliibiliry of republican government presumed a well-<>rdered society. And a weU...Xred society, in tum, presupposed the existcntt of hierarchically organized
111bunirs, such as families and workplaces.•

J-hed

• Ntsl H. C.ogan, ed., l'he Complete B;J/ ofRights: The Dr1JflS, Vebates~ Snuret1, and Origins (New
York: Oxford Unh·ersity Pres~ 1997), 6.h 67. Thie quotacions arc from the Non:h Carolina
'

•

1

•

nnfymg con""''°"·
Obm Ellswonh. "/\ l.andholckr, No. 7." In Cog.n, td., TM C.0...pl•tt Bill of Rlglm, 78.
Ah:hougb. James M;id1wn arguably bt.hcvcd that a well'"<lcsigncd constttu11on01I $f$tem could
rhn't't e'len in lhc 01bM::nce of virruousofticeholders, (ew o(h1s contemporaries seem ro have shared
rhi• convforion. Nor is it tiuirely clear rhat Madison hdd the amoral view o( po1iric3I r.oc.;cty that
•often attribured io him. Stt., fof' example, Lanct &nning. Tbe Sacrtd ,.,,.~of U~rty: jamu
"""-'i and th< Foi.ndmg ofU.. Fnlu•I RtP..b/u: (Ithaca: Com<lJ UnMt$1ty Pr<SS, t 998), 4 7.
Jama Kent, C.onmirntanes on Amrnu11 Low, Vol. 1. (N<W Yock: 0. Halstad,. 1827).
AA Wilham Novak hou: put the potnr, the particular bundle o( rights to which a ninetecn:th-ttncury
American could lay <.la11n W<l" "'highly patticulari1.cd lanJJ t.kpend<'RI upon lanl individual's
ptraonal pattern of residence. juriMikdon, office. juh, tiervk't, organi1.1trion 1 :bsociacton. fomily
J)Oliuoo, age, 1tender, race. and c:apadty. • "'The Legal Traosform1rion of Cir.iunship in
N1nnttnth.C.U1wy America,• in _\1ta Jacobs, WillU.m J. Novak. •nd Jtilian E. al12<r, «!..,
l1w IHmoero.tie l:.xpnmtn11: New DirtalOM m Amnlt.an Pol1t1cal Hut0ty( Pnooeloo: Princeton
lhuvc:rsny Press., 1009), 85-119, 95. Set al50, Williamj. Nonie, Thi' P«Jpl.t'1 Wtlfare: Law and
ltlplation in Nmelttmtb-Cenlury Amnic.a (Chapel Hill: University o( Norlh Carolin3 PrciS,
19~6).
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To see this morali1,ed and pariiculnrized conception of rights in action, we need
only examine a few illustrative cases involving religious liberty and the freedom <)f
the press. Consider the case o f john Ruggle.,,, a resident of New York who in 18u
appealed his blasphemy conviction to his •tatc'• highest court. At first glaoce,
Ruggles had a strong case. He pointed out that New York's coostitution
guar.uueed the freedom of conscience and barred the establishment of an official
religion. Moreover, bla>phcmy was not explicitly mentioned as a criminal act in
any Statute enacred by the state legislature. And yL'f Judge James Kenc, in the face of
these apparently mirig.1ring facts, affirmed Rugglc.'s conviction. Although Kent
acknowledged that New Yorlc had "discarded religious establishments,• he
insisred that it had not repealed rhose pam of the common law that served to
"inculcate moral discipline" and "bind society together. "7 Blasphemy would
conrinue to be punished as a crime in New York not because it offended "the
rights of the church• but because it "tcnd[ed] to corrupt the morals of the people,
aod to destroy (the) good order" that was the esseotial prttcquisite of republican
government.*
If the rights of conscience belonged in the first instance to Protestant Christians,
the duties that corresponded to these rightl> fell disproportionately on nonbelievers
aod religious minorities. This was nowhere more evident than in early appellate
cases involving Sunday labor. In Commonwealth v. Wo/f(1817), the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court dismissed a Jewish tradesman's constitutional objections to a state
law that criminaliud nonessential labor on the Christian Sabbath. Although the
state's constitution guaranteed the free exercise of religion, the Court reasoned that
Wolfs rights had not bL-cn infringed, since nothing in (its reading of) the Jewish
sacred texrs commanded Jew;, to labor on Sundays. Wolf was free to forego labor
on Saturdays, but rhe srnrc constitution did not guarantee his right to make up for
lost time hy working on the day when "the great mass" of the state's citizens
believed God had commanded them to rcst. 9 An 1886 dcx:ision of the Georgia
Supreme Court employed the s.imc line of reasoning, noting that prntcttions for
religious liberry would be but "paper guarantees, unless protected and enfore<!<l hy
legal sanction•," including Sunday closing laws, that ensured a quiet and
wholesome environment for "religious worship.'" 0
People v. Rugg.lei, 8 John~. 190. 196, 194 (• 81 1 }. Mosl ea.rl)' Amt":rican rommcntators acapred
John L.ockt'.s •rtturflt'ru that S«ular authot1t1C$, whose primary m-ponsibility was to safeguard
ciri1.cn.s· fibtny and proptny, hid no bus1nw either pracribmg or proscribin,; particular artides
of &irh Of" forms of worship. 1nn conctprioo m.arke!d • ~•g.mhcao1 bttak with English pracricc in
that it genera Hy barttd I~ succ from pcn«-1.1t1ng Ctb.un~ whose ooly crlOle was lO bdong roan
unpopubir "Ca~ Y~ as IC.mi's R."JCJ."'"' op1n.un m.aka dear, mos' Judges wttt noncthdcss
~-upportivc of laws 11\a1 cuhi"attd rnpo."C for rdigmn (read: Proccs:caot Christiani1y) in tM
absinct. For Lnckc'• con«p11on ol ttlW""' hbcny,..., •A l<=< Cona:rrung Toleration," in
bn Shapiro, ed., T"'°
of Ciowrrmtbtt onJ a I.Itta C-ummg Tokration (~''"
Haven: Yak Univ0"5iry P'rni.. a.oo3). i. t r-s6.
'8Johos (N.Y.) 190 (•lu).
• J SnJ. & 1Uwlq8; 1817 P•. LEXIS
p.
0
'
Thc:Trustttsol1hr Fini Mnhodm Fprte0p0I Oumh.South •• Thc:Ciiyoi Ad•nci, 76 Ca.181,
7

r,,.,...,

•o••

191, . ,.~J (188&).
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·tar assumptions govcmcd early interpretations of constitutional free
provisio11s. Most co'."mcntators agrL-ed :ha~ the commo.n law definition
{lecdom of the press, which barred only the pnor restramt of ~peech, was
·cnrly protective of individual libcrry. And many were also cnncal of the
doctrine of seditious libel, under which virtually any speaker who
a government official in print could be prosecuted, so long as the
1Cted after the offensive material was published.'' By the early nineteenth
ry, mosr of rhc States had formally declared - whether by ~nstitutional
mcnt, judicial decision, or Stlltute- that speakers who, 111the1udgrnenr of a
Jlr7• published factual information with up>tinding motives would be guilty of
1

-~~as

antebellum Americans enthusiastically exercised the right to criticiu
iliteh<>lders, they s=dfasrly resisted aoy ~estion that tlUs newfound.~
....,iicd a brooder right to challenge the lcginmacy of eottcnched authonry 111 the
or "domestic" sphere. This much bc:crum clear in the m1d-183os, when
C r Andrew Jackson authorized US postmasrus to destroy the antislavery
11erature that Northtm abolitioniSl» had recently begun mail.ing to Southern
~· '> Jack>on's Postmaster General, Amos Kendall,. ~t further,
loulhcrn stares to enact their own laws to prevent the dissenunanon of abolinomst
llla'atute. According ro Kendall, neither the first Amendment nor any other
pnwision of the Constitution had di>'tllrbcd the slave states' right to ." fence and
plllUCI their interest in slaves by such laws and regula11ons as, in the1r sovereign
will, they may deem expedient.",.
Chief Junice Roger Taney's majority opinion in the •857 Dred Scott Case
.,.scJ any remaining doubt that the scope of constitutional speech rights was
determined by an individual's position in a broader matt ix of legally enforceable
tnrcrpcrsonal relationships. Although the case primarily conccmed the legal
11atus of chattel slavery in the territories, Taney wenr out of he~ way to declare
that even free blacks were excludl-<l from the privikgc'S and immunities of

.llfl:i?s

Writing in 1789, Thom" Jc:ffcr11on exprmcd hopt thar Americans would •nor be deprived. or
1brid~cd of 1ht1r righr m speak, co write. or uthetw1se ro publi.sh any thing but fa~ facts
afkctmk injuriously the life, property o r reputation of olhcn o r a.fftcting rhc puce of the
confederacy with foreign natlOns. • Thomu Jefferson ro James Madison, August i_8, t 789. ln
Nt•I H. Cogan, td., Th< Comp/tu 8>11 of ll1gh1" Th< D.afu, D.baus. So•ras, and Origim, wd
ed. (Ntw Yori<: Oxford Uruvtn1ty Pre:>., 101 s>. 181.
•• far the most 1nAucnri1l naccmtnr of thu nde, 5CC Judge James Ken.r's opinion in Ptop~ v.
Cm.well, J John<- Ca•. JJ7 (N.Y. •llo4).
.
" Ja.,.ic!iOn used hi1 18u Annu~I M~ to Congress to W'f¢ passage. of ·.such a. law as ~II
prohibit, under scvett pmah,.., the cimdalion m the S..Utbttn StnCi ... ol inandiaty plbticanorb mtcndcd 10 in~u,ate the lb~ to iMUfKChon. • Stcpbto M. f.cklman, Frtt ExpresslOn and
o,,.,««1cyn.,1.mmca:A Hr#"'7(CbJaao' UnrV<ni1yolOucago
130.
.. M>o& quoi<d an M.:ha<I Kent Curo., fTtt Spttcb. "llH Ptoplc's Darlmg Pm'ikgc·: Stntgglcs
for f'rffllom of Expr,,,_ >n Ammcan llr#<>ry (Durham, NC, OW.• Uru.....tty l'r.u,
11

Pr...,"'°'''

IOOO), lJI.
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narional citizenship. To recognize free blacks as full citizens, Taney r=ned,
would enrail rhe unimaginable consequence rhat
prrsons o( the ncgro racet who were recognized a.s ciriuns 1n any one State or the Union,

(would en1oy) 1he nght 10 enter every 01her St.ne whcne••cr 1hcy pleased ... and;, would
g;ve tbtm tht ful/ l1berty ofspeech ;n pubUc and in pritldu upon oil subjects upon wb;ch
fa Jtate's/ own atiuns might speak ... (and} 10 hold public mtttings upon polaical
affairs ... And all of this would be done in the face of1hc subject race of the same color ...
and incvi~bly producing discontent and insubordinarinn among them, and endangering

1he peace and safety of 1hc Sia<e."
For Taney, it was simply "impossible ro believe" that che Southern framers
"could have been so forgetful or regardless of cheir own safety" as to endorse
the existence of rights whose contours were unaffected by their impact upon
preexisring authority structures. ' 6
One finds the same line of reasoning in countless ninctecnrh-ccntury cases where
an asserted constitutional right of free speech collided with entrenched social
hierarchies. Aurhority relations within the family, for example, remained largely
unaffected by developments in the realm of constituriona I law. Women in the early
republic were regularly prevented from speaking in public, particularly to mixed
audiences. Sa11e and federal obscenity laws-known as Comstock Laws, afttt their
chief proponent - barred discussion of comraceprion and fumily planning. And
although women raise:<! constitutional objections to these restrictions (and many
others), their picas typically fdl on deaf cars. As justice Joseph P. Bradley explained
in r 873, in a case involving the Illinois s1a1e bar's refUS:tl 10 admit a woman, "the
law of the Creator" had decreed char women were 10 enjoy only those rights that
were essemial to " fulfill[ing] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.""
Nor did civil liberties provisions significantly interfere with a111hority
relations in the workplace. As nineteenth-century workers who invoked the
frccdom of speech in defense of the right to organize quickly discovered, the
legal prerogatives of the employer trumped - or rather defined the limits of the constitutional rights of the employee. ' 8 In some cases, employers and antiunion officia ls suppressed labor organi2.ing by relying on ordinances that
" 6o U.S. J9J, 416-1 7 (•8s7).
'
Ibid. ar .+ • 7· r,·mthe moR n:phm coosrinmoo.al guannttn. such as Ilk fint Ammdmrnt right
10 • pcm- 1he C'....-.mmcnr ft>< a redtUS of l!Jl<"IKH, • had bnl< p.-.cucal d!ttt wbm the
sub;cn
sb•-.ry. In •836, rhe US Hou,. adopced 1 nil<- urfocmally known as
the •pg rule" - that aurom•tically abkd all sbvccy-ttbred P<llllOOS. S.. Curus, htt S/>«<h:
"The Ptopl.'1 O..rlmg PnV1kg<, • r38, 175- 81.
" 8,.dwcll v. lll1noi<, 83 U.S. 130, 14i (<873). Br.rdlcy,J,.concurnna.
' ' Katrn Orrtn, 81/at~ Fr"'1alism: Labor., th~ Law, and [11Hral lHvtlopmmt m th1 U1uud States
(New York: Cambr1dg1: University Pres~ t99t), 9 2. A" Orren purs the point, '1'be employee
1

'"'I"<""'",..,

lived in a divided Polnical world. One St'<.'tiOn was governed hy puhftc reprcscnNtivcs of his own
choosing., i1l rituals festooned and celebrated with the b:allyhoo or party politics, f!«>pled by
silvcr·congucd oralors and war heroes. The other was sealed off from the public, disciplined and
drab, irt governance located fin.ally in the somber and mystifying routines o( the courtroom.,.
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~ucet speaking to certain (typically inconvenient) times and places. In
they arrested organizers on vague charges that included vagrancy and
mg the peace. But the most powerful tool in the anti-union arsenal was
i.tior injunction: a court order rhat en1oined workers and organiurs from
·ng, boycotting, or otherwise interfering with the operations of a
· tar business. Although constitutional free spc«h provisions were
;..rauy understood to bar "prior rcsrrainrs~ of speech, judges reasoned char
,dcmonstr.ttions, b~ threa_tening the cmployer'.s property i_nterest in the
,.-ccful operation of his busmess, crossed the lme that divided peaceful
f!dY<>'•CY from ha rmful conduct.••
The Union victory in the Civil War is often described as marking a fundamental
~ in American thinking about constirnrional rights. It is certainly true chat
JJncoln and his fellow Republicans vehemently contested justice Taney's
,..ertion that the preservation of slavery trumped all constitutional claims that
,iight he asserted on behalf of free blacks or other residents of free states and
.,ntories. Moreover, by the war's end, most northL-m An1ericans were convinced
dilr chattel slavery was an affront to rhe ideals of libcrry and equality. And to
~ slavery's demise, all agreed, ir would he necessary to nationalize at I~~
IOIDt constitutional rights. Thus, the Fourteenth AmendmL"llt, adopced in 1868,
_ . t Congress and tbe couns with the formal authority to ensure tha1 no stare
denied 1b residents equal protection of rhe laws; deprived them of life, liberty, or
property without due process; or ~bridged the "privileges and immuni~" of US
cilixns- But while tbe Rcconsrrucnon amendments granted a measure of liberty to
die former slaves, they did not fundamcnrnlly airer the definition of liberty itsell.
Indeed, many of rhe same commcnrators who denounced slavery as a moral
evil remained steadfastly supporrive of the legally enforced hierarchies that
ordered the home and the workplace. Many of tbem also envisioned a future
In which African Americans and other racia l minorities would occupy a
1Ubordinate position in society. And nearly everyone agreed that traditional
andards of personal morality should continue co delimit the bou ndary
between liberty and license. Thus, Thomas M. Cooley reminded readers of his
influential Co11stitutiona/ Limitations that rhe right to publish true staremenrs
concerning public affairs did not protect one who published a factually accurate
account of a criminal trial where rhe sub1cet matter was "such as ro make ir
improper that the proettdings should be spread before the public, because of
their immoral tendency, or of the blasphemous or indecent character of the
eYidcnce exhibited." Nor did religious liberty provisions proicet citizens who

Jidlor

1
•

Oa~1d M. Rab~ hu Spt-uh in Ju 1-orgorrm Y1ar1

(Ntw YQfic: Cambridge- Univcn:ity Press.,

1~97), 171-7~; t-eldm::1n, Fru &prt#ion "1ld DtmOC'faey i" A.mnic.a, :n.8-30. 135. As the
Suprtmc Coun exphlincd in GompetS v. Ruclu Stove&. Range C"..o. (19u), printed nuterial
backed by the threoar of union aaiviry acquired '"• force not inhering irt the words themselves,
ind therefore exceeding any possible right of speech which n sing.le individual might ha~·t'. Under
1uch clrcumsfanccs they beoome,, . verbal :acu, and ~s much subjn.'"t to injunction as the use of
1ny other force whereby propeny is l.mlawfutly dam11gcd," u. 1 U.S. 418, 139 (19 1 t}.
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dared to labor on rhc. Chrisrian Sabbath. Although Sunday labor bans were
adm1rredly l~ss than fair to .J_ews, nothing in the Constitution barred lawmakers
frnm. requmng that a certain amounr of "deference ... be paid ... to the .
religious convicrions of the majoriry. " •0
• •
THE BIRTH Of MODERN CIVIL LIBERT I ES, 1900-193;

Thn>t: <l~v~lopme~rs p~~ed the way for.• fundamenrnl shift in Americans' thinking
about CIVIi hbemes. fU"St, as the nanon grew more ethnically and rcligiousl
d1~erse, an~ as urban clires grew increasingly slccprical of rustonwy mo,1;
smcrures, II became ever more difficult to mainroin thar a brood moral
consensus defined the boundary between liberty and license. Ar the same time
acnv1st< from traditionally marginalized SC!,'lllents of American society began r~
c:!'3llenge. the kgm'.""cy nf ~nffl'11rh•.n hi,rorchi,.., •sgtts<ivel> •«crting novel
ngt;irs da~ :>0th m the courrs and m the forum of public opinion. Finally, a
ma1or ~mca. realignm~nt opened the h.1llsof power-and ultinutcly thecourrs to pm.:1sdy those Americans who had the mosr ro gain from a more expail~ive
conception of civil liberties.
. During th~ firsr three decades of the twentieth ocntury, internal divisions
wtrhin American Prorcsr:antism gradually reduttd the liberty-license distinction
to a shambles. Alth~ugh the split between modernists (er liberals) and
fundamenrohsrs was msge~ by. th<'(>~ogical differences, it was exacerbated by
d1sagreement! over the smte ~role m.pol1cmg them.oral and religious convictions of
1
the cmunry. Liberals, while nommally suppomvc of efforts ro cultivate public
morahry, tended to adopt a dynamic view of morality and r:o oppose cnforcernrnt
?f morals laws rhat appeared out of step with contemporary opinion and
11
mtellecn'.al trt11ds. Fundamentalists, in contrast, favored vigorous lTiforcemenr
of tradmonal moral and religious prerogatives. Thus, when fundamcnralL,'tli in
Tennessee and elsewhere banned the reaching of evolution in public schools, liberal
Prore=n.~ ~demne_d the laws as an affront to scientific inquiry and academic
freedom. S11111larly, m •9)0, when the binh control advocate and sex educator
Mary Ware Dennett was brought up on federal obscenity charges, mainline
a.o

Thoma~ M. Cooleyt A Trt".1tise on the Consmutiona/ Limitations wh;.ch Rt"s/ upon the
~"'"'" P<N'<T of th< Swa of th• Ammca• U•ioo, sih ed. (Bo.too, Ude, Brown, t88))
SS4-.- JSH .

u

'

~~ M. M.a~, hmdomknlalism and A"'tr•am CMltuu (New York-: Oxford Uruvtts.it)

Pre~, 1oo6); D.iv1d A. HolltuKcr, t,(tn Clow,, Tongues of Fire: Pmtnr.anr 1,1/Hra/;sm in
Modern Anrtmcan History (Prmcir:ton: Princcmn tJmvcrsiry Pms tOtj).
u Oa mainline Protcst:!nr c_rirkism of traditional moral111 laws. see John W, Com pron, .. R'•ang.c:Jjcal
Refonn and th< Parodn'""'11 Orogms of !he Righi to p,;,-3 cy • Marykmd Lau, Rn.•tw (
c
j6l.41.

•

.

1

s l.OT Si·

'"' P. C. Ktmeny. ·~-er. Ridalt, and lM DmnaalOO ol Rdig.ious Moral Rtlorm Pol1tlC5 in cM
'9 2 0S.. .. 111 .CfuiJtian S1:'1irh, ed., Tht St.cular RellOlulion: PctHT, fnterests. ind Confl1e1 in the
Sect1lantat10n of Amem:an P11/Jfl(: /.,tfe (Berktley: University nf Cnlilornia Press, 1003 ): 11 6-68
~~L
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Liberties ar.d the Dual 1.egacy of the Fo11r1di11g
nt groups including the Fcdctal Council of Churches and !he Young Men's
Association (YMCA) leaped to her defense.'-< The debacle of national
·non offered further evidence of a disinregraring moral consensus. Although
Eighteenth Amendmem was generally welcomed in rural and small•town
· , ir mer stiff resistance nor only from the nation's growing Irish and
ethnic cor.ununitics but also from many well-heeled urban WASJ>s, who
by now aCC11>'tnmed to living without the moral supervision of their
bors.
Walter Lippmann providl.J a trenchant analysis of these developments in A
'.a to Morals, one of the best-selling books of the !are 192.0s. Reflecting on
,.eacs such as the Scopes Monkey Trial, the splintering of American
Jrocestanrism, and the evident failure of prohibition, Lippmann concluded
..., rhe "acids of modernity" had "dissolvc[ed)" the traditional belief systems
9D which Americans had "habitually conformed." What was worse, it seemed
lliP!Y unlikely tbat there would develop ·a new orthodoxy into which men can
~t. • Whate•er boundaries might hcnceforrh be established to conmain
ildividual liberty would not be based on custom or religion but rather on
careful deliberation concerning the material needs of society. In the new age
of moral relati vism and personal freedom, Lippmann concluded, i: had become
•impossible for the moralist to command. He can only persuade. »s
Ar the same time that the i111151on of moral consensus was crumbling, vanous
poups of oursiders were beginning to detach rhe Constinition's civil liberties
provisions from their rradicional moorings in cusrom and common law.
lleimagined as abstract guarantees, civil liberties could be turne:I against the
_,- social struaurcs that had long been rhoughr to mark the outer limits of
illldiY1dual libert) in a republican society.Jews and Catholics, for example, bqµn
IO use constitutional arguments to oppose Protestant prosclyti1jng in the public
llChools. In several states, elected officials responded by d irl'<.'ting public funds to
perochial schools, thus implicitly endorsing the right of Catholic children to
nai>'C a publicly funded education that did not conflict wirh the reners of their
flith."' Morcovtt, five state judJciaries - most of them in states with signi/icant
C.ul1vli< popula1iono - had by 19~0 declared thot Prorest:int Bible readjng in the
public schools amounted to an unconstirutiona l establishment of religion.• 7
.. By !hos poun, th<tc p1Jlan of !ht Prot.-..ant csublishmen1 had condud<d tlu1 socnrilially bued
M:X tdl.Kanon, rather than blattktt et:n!Orship, provl<kd the surest rourt 10 a fn(ll21Jy upstaodmg
atm::nry. Con5tt."ttt M. Chen, -Th. .W x Side ofllf6• : Mary Ware INnNtt•s tsoneering &tdt
for 8trth Control 1md Sex Edu<.11rion {Ntw York: The New Pr~ss.,
i.99. Denocrt's
4"11.mvKtion was t'vcmually overrurncd in a fandm:irk federal coun n1lin,g that substantially
ELlrTOYi'ed the dd:n.itioo of obscenity undtr federal law. U.S. v. Denn(«, j9 F.id 564 ( rg30}.
•• WUkr Lippman.a. A PrefaatoAforols (New York: Transactioo Publ1sht:n, i,6o), 318, 1~10.
.. s....,, K. Gtt.n, ~ 81/Jk, th• S<bool. "1fd th< ConstitNJKNt, ~ CIMb '""'' Sbap<4 Modnn
Chffr<b-slate D«trinf (New York: Oxford Univen-ity Press,.1011).
17
Mtehael J. Klarr1:m, .. Rerhinking the Civil Rights and Civil Libtrcies Revolutions, .. Virgmia
Law Review(i 9,6), 1-67.;o.
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Around the same time, labor activists began ro exchange polarizing appeals
to class struggle for the more anodyne language of civil liberties. ' 8 In the early
' 92os, the novelist and labor organizer Up1011 Sinclair declared that there was
"one platform upon which it should be possible to gel every true American" to
stand with labor "for rhe purpose of bringing about industrial changes.• That
platform was "free discussion,• an "ideal ... carefully embodied by our
forefathers in the fundamental law of our nation and of every one of our
separate states.••• In • 92.0, a group of attorneys and academics with prolabor sympathies formed the nation's lir;,r major civil libenies organization,
the American Civil Libenies Union (ACLU), with the primary aim of securing
constitutional prorecrion for pickets, OO)'COrts, and other organizing activities.
In conjunction with rhe Industrial Workers of the World (!WW) and other
groups from the labor movement's radical wing, the ACLU worked to
reframc anti-organizing measures a~ affronts to the constitutional liberties of
average Americans. 10 A panicularly successful strategy involved having labor
activists who were barred from speaking under local ordinances or injunctions
read the Bill of Rights in a public semng, such as a park, with the aim of being
arrested. The jailing of citizen• whoo;c only apparenr crime was 10 read the
Constitution aloud in public led many Americans to conclude !hat
constitutional rights were, in foct, at stake on both sides of the picket line.''
The racial order was also undergoing unpreccdcmed changes as large
nunibers of African American~ began to migrate northward in search of
greaier economic opportunity in the nation's urban centers. Wiih expanded
economic opportunity came the growth of an African American middle class,
which in turn facilitated rhc founding of organizations, such as the NAACP,
that were dedicated tO puhlicizing the evils of segregation and funding legal
cha llenges to Jim Crow.J• In addition, the sudden enfra nchisement of large
numhers of African Americans, many of 1hem concentrated in a handful of
.r.ll Sec, for example, Ken I. Ktrseh, .. How <.:ondu..,·1 tk--:1mc Sptt<.·h and Spccch Rccamc Conduct: A
Political Dcvclopmrm CaSt Srudy In l.ilbor Law and Lht frmlom of Spttch,.. U. Ptl. ]. Const. L.
8 (2006), i;s-97. 273-77.
19
Quoted in Paul L Murrhy, The Mtamng of 1-rttdom of Speech: 1-·1r11 Amendmttnt fTeedoms
from Wit.son 10 FDR (Wcsrport, CT: Greenwood Prns, 1971~, J.S8-59.
0
l
See, gt"nt"rally, Murphy, Tin Mt4ntng of Frttdom of Speech, u 7-30; /\1.ichad j. Klarman,
"'Rtthi~ the Uvil Right$ and C"t\111 I 1bt:ntr.~ R<"voluttons. • Virginl4 Law Rcvit-w (1996):
1-67, J9-40i Laura M. Wdnnb, •Ov11 l.J~rtK:.• 0Ut$1dc the Courrs,- Suprnne Court Revitw
1014 (1014,: 197-J'l, J0,- 11.

In 19u., for ~.xampk, the modcucc R~ublian editor Wilham Allen Whitt~ afttt bring briefly
jailed for dtfr•n& a.o. indusuul coun urdd' proh1b1bng dl!iCU~~ton of that year·s naciooal rail.road
smkc, penned a l'ulilUT pnu•WuuUnjC rolwnn on the suht= of frtt si-fl. Murphy, Tht
M=mttofl'l'ttdo... o{!;ptt<h, •6•-<IJ.
•• Doug McAd>m, l'ol1U<.t/ l'rouu a,.J tbt Dn'tlvpm....1 u( Black I~, ''Jo-1970, .ind
ed. (Chiag<>o Un"""ny of
l'ms, io10); ~t.c:bad J. Kbrnun, f-rom }mt Cro«> to CA'll
1Ugbt£
CoHn and th< Stntttk (OI" 1!.Kul /i.q..,/117 (New Ywk: Oxfocd Un;,..,.;'J'
Pn:ss, 200j).

Jjberries a11d the Dual Legacy of the Founding
I swing srnres, conferred increased political in6uence and, ulrimarely, a
favorable roceprion from the judiciary." Although the Supreme Coun
not begin seriously rocngagc with the problem of racial segregation until
94os and 1950s, the NAACP and its allies could by the 1920s poinr to a
of Supreme Court decisions that, at the very least, east doubt on the
tionaliry of racial disenfranchisement, residential segregation, and
minated criminal trials. H
IM midst of this atmosphere of social upheaval, justices Oliver Wendell
, Jr., and Louis D. Brandeis penned a series of (mostly dissenting)
Coun opinions that are widely seen as marking the birth of modem
libnTics. Word War I and !he Red Scare of the early 192os provided the
tc context for the great Holmes and Brandeis dissents. In 1917,
had enacted the Espionage Act, the first federal law since the
on Act of 1 798 to impose explicit limitations on pohtical speech. As the
clttw to a cl~. and as Russia fell to the Bolsheviks, several states enacted
anti-syndicalism laws that imposed criminal penalties on speakers who
tcd the overthrow of the American political or economic systems. The
e Court upheld both types of restrictions, reasoning that the First
~menr did nor protect ;peakers who intended to sow social discord.
lfDl-s and Brandeis, writing in dissent, argued that restrictions on political
lpleCh should be upheld only in the event of a "dear and prt'SCnt danger" to.an
111portant governmental interest - something that was lacking in cases hke
Abrams v. U.S. (1919), where the speaker in question had, according to
Holmes, merely thrown a few "silly" anarchist leaflets from a Manhattan
sooftop."
Arguably more important rhan this doctrinal innovation, however, was the
11a1lar theory of political society 011 which it was based. In sharp contrast to
llinefeenrh ·cenrury commentators, Holmes doubled that it was possible, on the
..sis of objective crireria, 10 distinguish morally worthy ideas from those that
~ false or dangerous. American sociery, after all, was currently riven by
moral disagreement. And the problem of identifying objective mora l principles
became even more vexing when one considered the evolution of moral ideas
Oftr time. American history was replete with examples of activities and fo rms of
property- from slavery to liquor to lotteries - that were widely accepted or even
oelebratcd in one era only to be condemned as immoral in the next (or vice
wna). 1' When one considered that "time haldl upset many fighting faiths,• it
unclear why notions of morality should play any role at all in the process of
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" K<vin J. Mc Mahon, ltt<011JIMrotg ltO<Mvtll"" /tac.: I low tht l'midoicy Pa....d the /toad to
a,.,,. .. (Chicogo'
of 0.IOlgO
J.010).
,. ludwun v. Warley, 14J U.S.'° (1917); \ioorc v. l>mtpsty, 161 U.S. 8& ( 1923); N.i.xon v.
Hemdon, •n U.S. n6 (19•7).
" • 10 U.S. 616, 613 (1919), llolmcs,j.. d1umtmg.
,. Amcnc:aM' evolY'lng amtudcs 1oward hql,M)f and k>tttty rcpboon had a pa.rticulady significant
ODpacl on Holm<t's i!nnkiog abour 1hc nan= of consuruoonal riglns. Stt John W. Comp<on,
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constitutiona l inrerpreialion.37 &ner, Holmes reasoned, to interpret the
Consiitution without regard to 1he historical "accident of our finding certain
opinions natural aod familiar or novel and even shocking. •3 1
Bur how would judges delimit the boundaries of free speech, if not by
reference to broadly shared mores? Drawing on an argument lirsr advanced
by the English philosopher John Stuart Mill, Holmes answered that there was
no need for lawmakers or judges to concern themselves with the social effects of
particular ideas or creeds. Indeed, censorship was counterproductive, since
governmenis were so ofien misraken in their judgmentS abou1 which ideas
were so dangerou~ or wrongheaded as 10 justify suppression. And in an open
exchange of views, ideas that were socially beneficial would generally triumph
over those rhac were false or dangerous. "IT]he bes1 test of iruth," Holmes
asserted, was "the power of the thoughr to get itself accepted in rhe competition
of rhc marker.""
Brandeis, in addition to endorsing Holmes's "marketplace" theory of speech,
proposed r.har civil lihcrti<-s provisions were fundamentally concemt'<I with
protecting individual autonomy. The framers of rhe Bill of RightS, he wrote in an
oft-quoted dissent, hoped ro "secure conditions favorable ro che pursuit of
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings, and of his intcllea ... "They sought ro protect Arncricnn, in their beliefs,
their thoughts, !heir emotions and their sensations. They conferred ... the right to
be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights, and rhc righr most valued by
civili~ men."'° Nineteenth-cenrury commentarors thus had the relarionsbip
between conventional morality and republican government exactly backward: to
teach 1hcir fuU potential, what citizens most needed was not the moral tutelage of
the law bur rather a constirutionally prorected privare sphere. In addition, an
expand'xl t"Onccption of civil liberties would hcnefit society by allowing citizens
to boldly ns_scrt their views - whatever they might happen to be - in the public
arena, rhereby developing their deliberative faculties and stimulating others to do
the s.1me. Ir was not rbe heterodox thinker who was rhe "menace to freedom," but
rather the "inert" citizen who blindly conformed to inhcriled mores.4 '
Although the Holmes and Brandeis dissents stimu lated a great deal of
discussion in academic circles, few of their fellow justices expressed much
enthusiasm for the idea rhar couns should adopt a more asserlive srance in
civil liberties cases. To be sure, a majority of the Court held for the 6m time in
Cir/ow v. New York ( 1925) that the freedom of spc«h was among the righis
protected from stare interference by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
TI.. r....,.,.1,ca/ On11ns of tho Ln.;,.g Constitlltron (Cambndgr, MA' Huvard Uohtnity Pttu,
z.oq), r)0-41.

'' Abram$ v. U.S., 150 U.S. 616at 630, Holmes,J .• dis.~nring,
t• Lochner v, New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905), Holmn;,J,. dimnring.
Abrams v. U.S., 150 U.S. 6 16, 630 (1919), Holmes.1 J. 1 dlslicnting.
40
Olmstead v . U.S. 1 177 U.S. .438, 478 (19:i8), Brandeis,]., di.s10eming.
4
' Whitney v. California, 147 U.S. 357, 375-?6 (r917), Brandci~,J., c:oncurring.
19

mcnt.'' But even as the Court "i11corporated" 1he first Amendmem's
IPC«h clause, ii declined to expand the substantive definition of "free
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J and intellectual eli= were similarly ambivalenL Conservative
tators, while supportive of judicially enforced economic rights,
ly opposed enhanttd pr?rection for civil li~rties, at least :Where the
00 question could be claimed by labor organizers.•• Progressives, while
ly supportive of labor organi2ing, were skeptical of ane'."ptS to expand
auihority at a time when the coum seemed reflexively hostile to
ic regulation.• • The latter group was particularly alarmed by a string of
5 in which the Cowct had blocked attempts to tl'gulate rhe wages and
of workers. In the most nowrious of these rulings, Lochner v. New York
S), the Court found that a Jaw limiting rhc working hours of bakery
yees was nm a legitimate hea~th or safety regul!ti<m bu! rather. an
itutional interference wllh the liberiy of contract, a liberty ostensibly
in the Fourteenth Amendmenl's due process clause.46 If the justices
simply reading their laissez-faire policy preferences into the Fowcreenrh
nr - and progressives were convinced this was case - then ii made
ICflSC 10 provide the Coun with yet another doctrinal tool that could be used
diwart me will of democratic majorities.
Slrq>ucism of judicial auihority remained de rigucwc among left-leaning
~ns in 193z., when Franklin D. Rooscvcl1 won !he presidency in what
.,.aid come t0 be seen as a realigning election. Between 1937 and r943, Roo..,dt would appoint eight justices to rhc Coun. Precisely how this unpr=denred
penonnel turnover would impact constitutional doctrine_wa~ unclear, howev~r.
On !he one hand, as Michael J. Klarman has pointed our, FOR s dt"<.1:0ral victones
were underwrinen by "an extraordinary assemblage of traditional ourgroupS,"
lndudmg or!l'lnized labor, religious and ethnic minorities, a nd, eventually, African
,\mericans.•7 Ro=vclt's presidency therefore conferred a degree of polincal
iDftucncc on precisely chose groups who srood to gain from a mote assertive
j:IGllltrUCtion of the Constitution's civil liberties provisions. On che orher hand,
New Dealers - and even many labor leaders - were initially reluctant to

.. "' u.~. ,,._
., " ' U.~. 6 su1 6J8. Thus, !ht Gitlow C'.oun found thac the Coruutuuoo offcral no pro«coon ro
1

lj><ak<r wbo advoab:d •revofurionary nuil ICt""'• for the purpo5< of m....iu-ong the

C1pttal1.sc: o;onomic systtm.

.. For an 1nsighrful cfucu.ssioJl of rhc consttYati\ot t.btmrun dcJnue of frtt speech, see .Mark A.
Gnbu, Trrzmfmming fo-.. Spuch, Thr Ambit_, ug;Jq of Ovrl l.tbntaria>rism (llerkd<f'
lh:u~criutyof California Press. 1990), 17- 49.
ti Olk major cxa:ptioo ro rhe rule was Z«hariah Cha(fcc, whose writings on the freedom ol
tptt\.h arc thought to h<WC inAucnctd jusrice 1lol!Tk!i. ~e. for example. Cha.fee's Frudom of
Spetch (New York: Harcourt, Bract and Howe, 19z.o).
., 198 U.S. 4l ( •90J).
41 Klarman, .. Rethinking rhc Ci\•iJ Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions," 44-45.
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augment rhe Coun's aurhority at a moment when the Democraric Party had
stranglehold on rhe levers of lcgislarive aurhoriry.•8 Morco•-er, even if ~
reconstituted _Court could be rrusted to interpret !he Constitution in ways that
comported wuh the prograrnnuric goals of the Democratic regime, ir was unclear
how, at the level of doctrine, !he jusoces could simultaneously devalue economic
rights and expand civil liberties protections. To many observers, including futurt
Supreme Court Jusrice Felix Frankfurter, it seemed that the wiser SL1noe was an
across·the· board polky of judicial deference.
justice Harlan Fiske Stone's majority opinion in U.S. v. Cnrolene Products
( 1938) pointed rhe way out of this theoretical thickct. 49 In the opinion's famous
Foornote Four, Stone offered a pair of theories to explain why an expansive
conccpnon of civil liberties was not incompatible wirh a deferential approach to
economic regulation. First, he poinred out rhat the individual righrsenshrined in
the "first ten amendments" had a firmer basis in the text than economic due
process rights. Where che early-rwentieth-cenrury Court had relied on a series of
judicially created doctrines - including the "liberry of contract" - to o bstruct
the rise of rhe regulato ry state, the post- New Deal Court would confine its
scrminy of democratically enacted laws to those thllt violated textually
grounded righrs, including the freedoms of speech and religion. Second, Stone
noted that in casc-s where the democrntic process had been corrupted or where
"discrete and insular minoritiet." had been singled out for negative treatment,
judicial enforcement of individual rights could not fairly be described as
undermining dem~ratic principles. True, rhe exercise of judicial revitw in
such cases would have the effect of overturning laws that reflected (ar least
superficially) the will of the majoriry, but in so doing the Court would be
preserving the imegrity of the underlying democratic system - something that
could nor be said of the prc~New Deal Court's decisions inva lidating broadly
popular economic regulations.
When combined with the earlier opinions of Holmes and Brandeis, Stone's
C'.nrolene Products footnote provided rhe blueprint for a radically new
approach ro civil liberties. Instead of relying on inherited mores or religious
views to mark the boundary between liberty and license, the Court would now
read the Constitution's civil liberties provisions as demanding maximum scope
for the free play of ideas and the self-development of individual cirizens. And
instead of assuming that longstanding inegalitarian features of American
sociery were essential to the survival of republican government and thus
deserving of judicial deference, the Court would take a skeptical view of laws
that worked to the disadvantage of "d iscrete and insular minorities." For the
next three decades, the .First Amendment and other civil liberties provisions
would bent their most potent in precisely those cases that justice Taney and the
'' On orpn1ztd labor's skepctca.I attatude 1owards r:hc judiciary, xc WcllU'tb, •CiV11 Ubtrties
outsKkmeCoum,• ,,,_,,.

" J04 U.S. •H (1U8).

Scort majority had rejected as ~impossible" to take seriously - that is,
pitting marginalized citi•ens against encreoched patte ms of state and local
·ry.
a1GllTS REVOLUTION,

i 938- t973

the late i 93os and the c.uly 197os, the Supreme Court presided o~cr a
revolution" that stood the nineteenth-century theory of rhe co nst1tut1onal
on irs head. By the end of rhis period, it was genera lly accepted tha_t the
of speech, the free exercise of religion, and most of the other 1Dd1~1dua l
enshrined in rhe Bill of Rights were ( 1) enjoyed equally by all Amencans;
· on all levels of govcrnmenr; and (3) more or less inviolable, save in the
of a compelling ihre:u to public saftty or basic govem~n~l fun~ons. The
effect of the new way of minking was to elevate ovil h~es dauns above
cradirionally superior claims of domestic and local authority. Long relegated
peripheral position in American consritutional law, civil liberties now became
1
• fixed star" around which rhe constitutional system was said to revolve.10 • •
If a single decision ca n be said to epitomize the Court's .new approach to CIVIi
·es ir is West Virgilrin v. Barnette, a r943 case involv111g a group of
ah's Wimess children who were expelled from public school for refusing
u lure the flag.'' Only three years before, the Court, in an opinion by j ustice
fnnJcfurter, had upheld a similar compulsory Oag salute _la~ on !he gr_o.unds
•r efforts to promote a patriorie cirizellfY were ~veil_ within rhe i_r.idmonal
llounds of state and local authoriry. P But now three 1us11ces, perhaps mRuenced
llJ widespread reports of officially sanctioned mob violence against Jehov~'s
W°itmSSCS, had come to see the matter differently, and the Court reversed •ts
....Uer ruling. 53
•
Writing for the Rnmette m:tjoriry,justice Rohcrtjackson made rwo key pom~s.
Finr he denied that the scope of the Constitution's civil liberties guarantees was m
lllY ;..,.y afft.'Cted by the admittedly "delicate and highlydiscr<.'tion;irr functio~s.· of
local government. Perhaps he was thinking of the Witnesses well-pubhcizcd
1nvails. Or perhaps he was thinking of seve:ral recent cases mat had draw_o
- . hon to orber abuses of local authority, including the routine denial of basic
aiminal procedure protections ro Souchem blacks and the use of facially neutral
licensing schemes to obstruC'l labor organizing."' Jn any event, jac~n concluded
dw "small and local authority," far from serving as the essennal guardian of
cirittns' liberties, was comparatively more likely than national authority to
,. Wes1Virginia Staie Bd. of f.d uc. v. B:nnt ue, )19 U.S. 6i.4 , 6 41 ( 1 943).
t• J•9 U.S. 6~.. , 6 41 (•~HJ).
'' MinecsviUeSchool Oi!itrict '" Gobi1is, JIO U.S. 586 ( t9 40).
n On rhe possibilicy th:at the justices in the Ba:rnetu m3jority wcr-c infl uf'11Ctd by rc-~m of mob
vtoknce, see Kevin J. Mc~bhon, R«011$Ulering R.oouwll on Rau: How t~ Prnidmcy Pdwd
IN Road 10 Brown (ChJCagO: Unnf'rs:.icy of Oi.K::ago Press, io10). , ..~.. r.
" Stt, 1oc cnmplc. Powdl •.Abba.,,., >87 U.S. 4j ( 1,)1); Noms v. Abba.,,., 294 U.S. j87
h'Jj~ Hagu< v. Conurutttt foe Industrial o.gan;utioo, )07 U.S. 496
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threaren rhcm. Instead of deferring to the cdim of "village tyrants," the Coun
would henceforth be especially diligent in scrutinizing their activities.H
Second, Jackson laid to rest che ninereenrh-ccnrury undemanding of the
relationship between religious and moral orrhodoxy on the one hand
and republican government on the other. In sharp conrrast to James Kent
and the countless nineteenth-century commentators who had defended che
constitutionality of blasphemy laws, Jackson's reading of history indicated
that arrempts to achieve "[c)ompulsory unification of opinion" in matters of
religion were destined to fail or else to achieve "only the unanimity of the
gra vcyard. • Nor was there any credible evidence to suggest that allowing
citizens the "freedom to be intellecrnally and spiritually diverse" would
"disintegrate the social organization. "S 6 Henceforth, the J'irst Amendment
would be understood to require that common convictions be arrived at
volu ntarily or nor at all.
But if Barnette indicated that the Court would not hesitate to dismantle
entrenched authority in the name of universal righrs, it provided lirde in the way
of a brooder theory that might delineate a new boundary between individual
liberty and official authoriry. Unable to invoke the idea of a sock-ry-wide moral
consensus for this purpose, the mid<rntury Court relied instead on Holmcs's
marketplace metaphor and Brandeis's autonomy ideal The marketplace
metaphor provided the rationale for a series of decisions that effectivdy stripped
stare and local governments of their longstanding authoriry to regulate public
discourse. Laws punishing subversive speech were now unconstitutiunal in the
absence of a "clear and present danger" to an important governmental interest (or,
in rhe later, more stringent formulation, where the speaker seemed likely to unleash
"imminent lawless violence")." Laws that indirectly restricted speech in the
interest of public safery or convenience had to be narrowly tailored and neutral
with rcsp<."<."t to the viewpoint of the speaker. Requiring licenses of speakers was
permissible in certain limited cases (as when a group sought to hold a parade on a
busy public street), bur license laws were to be purely administrative in nature,
leaving officials powerless to discriminate against particular ideas or speakers.'1
The Court's critics-including internal ones like Frankfurter- warned that che new
docrrincs would leave states and municipaliries powerless to combat the social
unrest char inevitably accompanied extremist speech making. But a majoriry of the
justices were willmg to run the risk of occasional disorder if in so doing they
prev~ted an even greater evil - namely, the "srancbrdizatioo of ideas" by
"dominant political or community groups. •s•
'' In adchrton. jackJ()fl reasoned th.ar consrirunoo41J V1olanoru: ar rht lool lcvcl "~more ljkdy
acapc ckrccuoo, \in« rhc '"agents of publiciry"' were rypteally ~, d1l1gent in reporting on them.
)19 U.S. 6•~ at 6J?-J3.
'' Wesr Virginia Sure Board of Education v. Bamcm:, J r9 U.S. 614, 641 {19.0).
J., Brandenburg v. O hio, J9S U.S. 444 (1969).
' ' Cantwell v. Connc:ctic:ut, Jto U.S. 296 (194o);S3i:a v. New York, JJ4 U.S. ssB (19..8).
ft Tcrminitllo v, Chic.1.go, JJ7 U.S. t , 4 ( 1949).
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In decisions involving constitutional challenges to nineteenth-century morals
the Court regularly invoked some version of Brandeis's "right to be let
, • a right that extended beyond spacia l privacy to include a guarantee of
· nal autonomy with respect to (among other things) matters touching
sex and reproduction. In Stanley v. Crorgia (1969), for example, the
mvalidatcd a state law making it a crime to possess obscene material.
1'riring for the majority, Justice Thurgood Ma!'lhall reasoned that "a State has
_,business telling a man, sirring alone in his own home, what books he may
.-cl or what films he may watch."'°
(cnrury-uld laws restricting the sale, distribution, and use of contraceptives met
uimilar fate in Griswold v. Connecticm (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird (1971).' '
MrJiough rarely enforced, contraception bans were dt"termincd by the Warren-era
julticcs to violate a constirutionally enshrint-d right to reproductive privacy, a right
.,enrually found to be lodged in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.
1bc underlying problem was that Coms1ock-era contraception laws inserted "the
_.chincry of the criminal law" into rhe heart of citiz.cns' most intimate
adlbotl~hips and personally consequential decisions.•• "If the right of privacy
_.., anything,• the Court declared in Eisenstadt, i1 was that citizens were "to
lie free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
.&ccung a person as the decision whether ro bear or beget a child.••>
Autonomy rationales also figured prominently m a series of contemporaneous
decisions that dismantled many longstanding symbols of Protestant cultural
IMgcmony. Writing for the Court in Ewrson v. Board of Ed1tcation
(1947), Justice Hugo Black found that the autho!'l of the First Amendmenr
llld intended to erct"t a "high and impregnable" "wall of separation" berween
church and state.64 The case turned on the question of whether a local
pttnmcnr could use public funds to offset the cost of transponing students to
Catholic schools, and a bare majority of the Court answered in the affirmative.
But it was Black's reading of the Establishme1ir Clause - as opposed to the rather
incongruous holding - rhat marked the real turning point. Henceforth, the First
Amendment would preclude not only the recognition of a national church but
YinuaUy any officia I act that might be construed as encouraging citizens ro adopt
a particular point of view concerning religion. By the early 196os, the Court had
prohibited teacher-led prai•er and Bible reading in the public schools on the

'°""

• E- 1( "8>nmatr muons f<n policing penonal morahry <XU(cd (which l\Unhall doubml~ rh<
" pii&looorf>yol th< FustAm<ndmtnr' would noc pcnnu th.sure 10 pun..e1agoalsbf policing
·pn~1tc thougha• or the •private consumpnon of 1cku a.od mfoonatioo."' 394 U.S. lS7 ar
H"'°l7·
•• Jlt U~. 4 79 (1965); 405 U.S. iJ8, H3 (1971).
.., POt v. Ullman, 167 U.S. 497, H3 {r96t) Harl.tn,J., dt"'nung; Griswold v. Connecticut, J t 8
U.S. H9 l1965).
•• Eikn,tadt v, &ird, 40s U.S. .08, 453 (197:z.). Emphasis addtd.
"' Etweraon v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 , 18 ( 194 7). The phrase .. wall of separation" was
borrowed from Thomas Jefferson's 18o:z. letter to the l)11nbury l\aprisr Association.
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grounds that these practices exerted "coercive pressure" on children 10 adopt the
religious views of the nujority.'s A similar logic underpinned a subscquem series
of religious free exerci!e decisions that granted religious believers the right to
demand exemptions from generally applicable laws. Under the doctrine
announced in Sherbert v. Verner (1965), citittns whose ability to practice their
chosen faith was "substantially burdened" by a stare or federal law were cntidcd
ro relief unless rhe govunmenr could demonstrate that granting an exemption
would endanKcr a compelling govcmmemal interest."
In kttping with the theory of the Caro/me Prod11Gls foo1no1e, the mid-century
Court was ar its most assertive - and creative - in cases where an individual or
group could plausibly claim to have been silenced or disenfranchised by
structural incqua litil>s or fla,vs in the nation's rcprc.'Scnrotive system of
governmcn1. Indeed, wha1 gives the period's major civil liberties decisions a
sense of coherence, even in the face of bitter disagreemem over par1iculars, is
1ha1 rhe Court !ended to read both rhe marketplace and autonomy ideals through
the lens of Carole11c Products. Without necessari ly raking a position on the
relative importance of liberty and equality as constirurional values, the Coun
insis1cd 1ha1 itS institutional role demanded a more robust response 10 alleged
civil liberties violations .nvolving traditionally subordinated Americans. Because
judicial authority was most legitimate, and thus most poo:nt, in cases whcre the
dcmOCTatic proa:ssc:s had gone awry, it was incumbent upon the Coun to pay
careful attention to bow authority - whether public, private, or a fusion of the
two - was actually experienced by citizens. This would ensure that the
marketplace and auronomy ideals were reali1.cd in fact, not just in theory.
The guarantee of an unfettered ideological marketplace, for example,
demanded more 1han formal stare neutrality with respect ro a speaker's
identity or message. even facially neutral speech regula rions now posed First
Amendment problems when their practicol effect was ro diminish expressive
opportunities for traditionally subordinated groups. Ordinances banning the
distribution of handbills were struck down in part because they outlawed a
mode of communication favored by labor organi1ers,Jehovah's Witnesses, and
other advocaccs of "poorly financed causes."' 7 State laws banning picketing or
'S:

F\•.-n 1l rh11A'"" vi.'""' P"""i~ to npr nu:t ol •mrh r~•m~, rhnr ,,.m•i,_f •.111n ~tt.
pttHUt< upon the duld to atttnd, • and those who ttfus<d woulJ lildy "haw in<ubt<d in
dwm a fec'hng ol kpllllta.m.. •Engel v. Viuk, 370 U.~. 411 at .0 1; ~tcCollwn w, Board of
Educauoo, JJJ U.S. 101 a i.27 .
rule 1ppl.od ...,. 10 .........,.., such as rompulsoty tduauoo bws and Wltlllployment

.. n,,.

compmsatton programs, ~ thttt was oo reason 10 btliie\.e th.al 1ht Uiltt had intended ro
butdtn
Pfil<IK<. As jusuc:e Bttnnan explained 1n hi$ opinion f0< the Sha'-< majority,

"''"'°"'

rhc F1rn Am~dmcnt dtd ll()( pemm che srarc fO •prwurc• :a puson "to choose between
following rhe precepts of her rehgion ~ on rhe one hand and obeying the l.1w {or receiving
bcncf;n) on the other. Sh:rbcrr v. Verner, 374 U.S. j9H. -404 (196j). Also 5CC Wisconsin v.
Yoder,~~ U.S. 105 ( 097!).
'~ MaNin v, Srrurhc"*t }19 U.S. t .p.
.
r46 (1943). Also"~ Schneider v. The St:atc, 308 U.S. 147
( o939).

•ir

· g labor organizers ro register with rhe srare were similarly problematic,
practical effect was to silence the traditionally disadvantaged side in
ing debate over "the desriny of modern mdustrial society. " 68
C..ourt's egalitarian reading of 1he First Amcodmenralso played a critical
iD di>maoding the South's racial caste sysrem. As late as the early 196os,
officials bad ar their disposal a range of leµI rools that appeared well
10 turmng back challenges to whire supremacy. These included statutes
nng the activities of out-of-state corporations, statures barring outside
from organizing or funding litigation, and the long-established right of
· officials to bring libel suits against group~ or indiv·duals who damaged
reputations. Although most of rhesc wols were well wirhin rhe traditional
of ...rate and local authority, the Court used the First Amendment to block
of 1hcm in turn. In NAACI' v. l'atterson \ 195~), 1t held that a state could
force a civil rights group to disclose its membership rolls where there was
to believe rhar group members would face "economic reprisal, loss of
yment, [and rhe) threat of physical coercion.••• Similarly, in NAACP v.
(1963), the O>Urt refused ro "dose firs] eyes to the fact" that facially
I laws targeting cbamperry and barrarry - in c-scncc, the stirring up of
ous law•uits - were being used to deprive African America11s of the "sole
able avenue" by which they migh1 sttk redress for injuries suffered at the
of the "politically dominant (whirel community."~ A final landmark
~on, New York Times v. S11//ivan (r964), e\'1sccrated the common law of
. . as 1t applied to public officials." In addition 10 setting aside an Alabama
$500,000 libel award to a police commissioner who b.ad been criticized in
print by a civil rightS group, Sullivan held rhat public officials hoping to win a
~ judgment would henceforth have ro meet the high standard of proving
"11C1Ual malice."" Any less stringent standard, 1he majority reasoned, would
...Ye the effect of "chilling First Amendment freedoms in rhe area of race
lllations.""
Ar rhc same time, die mid-cenniry Court adoptc-d a more deferential approach
illcasb where the stare- or, more likely, the federal government- could plausibly
claim ro be acting with the aim of mitigating the effects of structural inequality on
Amcncan dcm<lctacy. The justices were particularly ~kcptical of claims that the
Pint Amendment protected corporate or commercial speakers from the emergent

I-Y's

• lu. thcC<>wt J.du.d in lbomhill v. Alaba.., (t940), rh. Ml cka>1m 1ou1<ndcoosoruoonal
ubo< pi<Jct<ing. me Jodoc;ary'< l""P<' ruk "°'DUI tu Jd<n<J I.be indusmal "arus
quo bur rou.bcr to C'.USUtt thal "'rhc group 1n powCI' at any rnummt (dots:J ooc: un.pose penal
..""rt0ns.. on those who;1dvoacc for pc:aiccfuJ polir-.~I ur n.voomJC :hangt:. 310 U.S. 38, 103,
104 ( 1940). tor tM Coun".s dccisiQn on '3ws rC'(f uirin~ tabor orpnatn to rcg:isrc:r widi the: st:.t1t,

""""""°I<>

•Th(')mas v. Colhns. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
" ll7 U.S. 449· ~6• ( r958). ,. pt U.S. 4'l• 4)0-J o (196J). " J76 U.S. >54 ( 0965}.
,. Th.at as, that rhe statement in question wa.s made with knowledge o( 1u falsity or with r«Jdess
dintKard for the nurh.

,. lhtd.1.n 101.
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rcgularory srare. In order ro discourage such claims, they drew a bright line
between expressive activities thar were primarily concerned with moneymaking
and those that were not. Advenising and soliciting were distinguishable from
the core FJ.l'Sr Amendment activiries of "communicaring mformarion and dis.
scminaring opinioofs]," the Court rca<0ned, and thus less worthy of judicial
prorcction.74 A similar line of reasoning produced a decision distinguishing pl'(lfessional lobhying efforts from the expressive activities of ordinary Americans. As
Chief jusrice Earl Warren wrote for rhe Court in U.S. v. Harriss ( r954), lll'W
federal regularions requiring lobbyisrs to r<-gi~'tcr with the C'A>ngrc.s and disclose
their sources of income were not an affront to First Amendment rights bur rather a
reasorutble means of ensuring that "the voice of rhe people" was not "drowned out
by the voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatmem while masquerading as proponenrs of the public weal. ··s
l.aws rhar made union membership a condition of cmploj•ment in certain
industries also surviv<-d First Amendment scrutiny. That some workers should
be required to join and contribute to unions followed narurally from rhe reigning
Democraric Parry's view rhar collecrive bargaining offered the suresr route to
industrial peace. By the r95os, however, critics of organi1.cd labor had seized on
the idea rhat mandatory union contributions violated the First Ame11dment by
compelling anti-union workers to subsidize expressive activiries rhat they
opposed. In International Association of Machinists v. Street (1961), rhe Cottrt,
speaking through justice Brennan, agreed rhar workers could not be compelled ro
support political activiry again5t their wills. At the same rime, Brennan found that
workers could be required to contribute ro a union, so long as the compelled
contributions were used only for core union acrivities such as organizing elections
and representing workers in negoriarions with employers. Alrhough the First
Amendment offered individual ciriu:ns protection against compelled speech, it
also gunranm::d the right of "the majority" of workers to form :rnd opemre a
union without "being silenced by the dissenters." Indeed, rhe Court was
consrirurionally obligated to balance rhe rights of individua l workers against
the right~ of workers as a class, protecting "both interests to the maximum
extent possible without b>ctmiuingJ undue impingement of one on the other."76

y significant devclop~enrs amounr to a r~l~tion? If rh.e t~rm implies
break with the governmg suucrures and lcgonmanng pnnc1ples of the
well as the successful consrruction of new amangements underpinned by
81
rive principles, then it is at least arguable that the Court's adminedly
rroarive rulings fell short of this srandard. Indeed, rwo problems - one
· al and one theoretical - plagued the mid-cenrury Court's civil liberties
dence, foreshadowing rhe eventual unraveling of the post- New Deal
sus 011 civil liberties. The prat'tical problem was that the jusrices, aware
Court's limited capaciry w enforce its own decisions, ofren seemed to pull
from principled stands when confronted wirh credible threats of
d noncompliance. As a result, the "rights revolution" ended with
· nt vestiges of the old order still very much in place.
Consider the ill-fated anempt to decouple church and state. The early 196os
• •0 ns on prayer and Bible reading in the schools made clear that the "wall of
rion • metaphor was more rhan empry rhetoric, as did a separate decision
lidating religious tesrs for state officeholdc:rs.11 And yet the Court's
rationist reading of the F.sta blishmcnt Clause was never fully marched by
loprnenrs 0 11 the ground. The school prayer rulings, in particular, proved
llfticult to enforce; a number of contemporary academic studies found that
8
lmlDY public school teachers and administrators simply ignored them.1
Ir is surely no accident rhat rhe Court, in the face of widespread opposition to
Ill rulings on religion in the schools, declined to follow Jusrice Black's metaphor
toils logical conclusion." When confronted with a challenge ro the tax-exempt
llllUS of religious entities in Walz v. Tax Commimon ( 1970), for example, the
~stopped short of ordering what would surdy have ~n the largest tax
IDaeasc in American hisrory. lndt-ed, even jusuce Black 1omed a tortuous
•ioriry opinion holding that governments that exempred religious bodies
6om taxation were nor "sponsoring" religion, but merely "ahstain[ingJ from
•anding that the churches support the state. ""0 (Never mind that rhese tax
exempt entities received, free of charge, a variety of public services.) Sunday
closing laws and legislative prayers likewise survived Establishment Clause
dialknges.8 1 Viewed collecrivcly, rhese rulings made clear thar the rights

THE REVOLUTION'S TROUBLED LEGACY

,. On local d<futnce ohh< Court'111chool pnyer rulinp in th< 1 '6oo and 1 nos. - Lucas A. Powe,
Jr.• Tbe Warren Cottrt and AmmC'Dn Politics (Cambridgt, MA: Setkmp Press, "1000), j62-~J;
Daniel K. Willi•ms. God'• Own Party, Tbe Making of Utt Christuzn Right (New York, Oxford
University Press. 1010), f.7,
" On the public reaction tn £11g~I v. Vitale, see Powe, 11Jc "'""'"' Cottrl (IHd Amerkan Polities,
187-90; Williams, Cod'10wn Party, 6~67. AsWllli.ims pointsouc,bc:JWccn r96i.and 1964 no
lewtr than 111 mcmbcri of Conp-tss introduced consutucfonal :.mcndmcnt!i overturning tht
C.ou.n's decision barring prayer in the public schools.

Clearly, the middle decades of the rwentieth cenrury witnessed a significant
resrrucruring of American sociery. Srill, rhe question remains: Do these
'" Valcnrinc v. Chresrcnsc.n. 316 U.S. 51 :u S4·

.,, U.~. v. Harri""- 347 U.S. 6n., 6i.5 (1954). The l:tw ddincd a "lobhy1i1t .. :u a pcr$0n "receiving
any conrrihurions or expending any money"' for the purpose of influcncing the pas$agc or defeat
of kgi11l:nic)n. Chief Justice Warren, 1pokfr1g for the m3;ority, agrttd. th;u the :Kt would havt co
I>< 1t>d ft3rrowly- as applying only to pood lobbyists who nguluty coos.Uoed wioh mM1btts of
Congrns- w survive constitutional JCr'Unny.

.. '''U.S. 7•0. 773 ( 19'1).

"Tocasov. Watlum, 3'7 U.S. 4U (1,61).

'"Wal... Tax Ccxnmiuoonof C"yol NtwYock, 3'7 U.S.

u,, 67J (1970).

• Aht.oogh Sunday Milli bws wttt undoubl<dly rdiglom in origin, a majority oi oh< Coun
loand 1ha1 they also t<n'ed oht S<CUlar purpose of prottctsngahU'ru' "hcolth, saftty, """""""Md gmenJ ....U-besng. • McCowan v. M.2rybnd. 366 U.S. 410, ••• ( • 9'•). L<gislativc pnycn,

94

john W. Compton

revolution would not end with the complete secularization of the American
scare.
A similar gap between principle and doctrine can be seen in the Court's
decisions on sexual and reproductive privacy. In <triking down a Massachusetts
law that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, the
Court had seemed to suggest that any official intrusion imo the ~decision wbcdier
to ~r or beget a child" was a fundamental violation of petSOnal autonomy. The
Court's willingness to issue such a sweeping statement of principle may be
explained in part by the fac"t that the nation's contraception laws had all but
lapsed into desuetude; in fact, the states that still had such laws on the books
defended them by claiming that there was no constitutional injury to redress,
since the laws were never enforced.
Regulnrion of abortion, in contrast, was alive and well in 1973 when the
Court dtoeidcd Roe v. Wade."' This may explain why rhe Court felt it advisable
to adopt a more cautious and pragmatic tone in its landmark abortion decision,
even as ir broadened the scope of the underlying righr. Whatever the reason,
Blackmun and the Roe majority determined rhar the primary problem with
abortion resrrictions was not that they interfered wirh privacy in the sense of
individual autonomy but rather that they impinged upon the patient-physician
relationship. Seen in this light, che consrirurional right to access abortion
services had to be balanced against rhe srare's interest in protecting the bealch
of the mother and, in the latter stages of pregnancy, the health of the fetus.''
Although R0t's immediate effect was to expand access to abortion services
throughout the nation, the medical privacy frame suggested obvious routes by
which abortion opponents might narrow, if not negate, rhe right ro terminate a
pregnancy.

while ccnainly intended tt;t promote resprt-'t for rdig:iun, were too .. deeply c:n:LbcJJed in the
!nation's) hilitory and tt'.&.dition"' to be deemed incompatible with lhc flill&blish.intll t Clause.
Manh v. Ohambc.., ~6 ) U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
h Danid K. Will11nu. •No Happy .Medium: The Role o( Amerians' Ambivalem View of Fetal
J(jA1>11 rn Political Confilc1 o'tr Abonion L<g;tlitatioi~• f o•mal of Policy History 1s.1 (101))'
41-61. By this Pomt lhe Libtraliurioo movt-mtnt of rht l.tite 196os. dunng whJC:h numerous
.,.,.. had l<phud tb<npeuoc abonioos and 1v»o had ltgahud abonoon •oo demand,• had
tfftt"'<fy 11alltd. Wrllwm pomB ou1 chat although numttO<As ,.., .. adopud dicrape•m< lows
in the Iott 196os, only°"" (Ronda) did so afler 1970, and 1lm as• mull ol a_,, order. In
!Wtnry-live tu« lcgr,J,ru,.. debated sudl laws, and all me ..,.,...,.. ~ dcfcotcd.
Mo~r. ' " r971~ TO<Crs m rwo SQtes (Michig:an :1nd Nonh lnkou) ddCurd thcr.tpcutic
:1bomon rcfonn 1n snlttwiclc rcfcrcncb. Also in t97.i.. the New Yorti: legislature: repealed dut
narc'• liberal abort100 law, but the rcpc:tl kgisbrion wic mocd by Governor Ndson
Rockefeller.
•' "'The Coun·11 dcci'l1c>n1 rccognjzing a right of privacy also acknowledge that wm.c- state rcgub·
tion in areas protected by that right is appropriate . . . A St3.te mjy properly lb:iert imp0rtanr
imeresu in s-ifc-guarding hc-.alth, iu maintaining medical standard~ and in protecting potentia1
lift. At some Point in prtg111u1cy, thtse respective interests become su(ficitndy col\\pelling ro
sustain regulation ohht faclOrs th:u go,•enl the abortion deci.sion.'" .po U.S. 113, J..H (1973).
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11ic theoretical problem that dogged civil liberties jurisprudence in this period
rhc rather murky narure of rhe rclarionship between the Court's civil
principles and its egalirarian theory of American democracy. We have
that the Court rejected Firsr Amendment challenges to commercial speech
nons, lobbying regulations, and union shop agreements. Bur it bears
s that ea<:h of these decisions provoked spirited dissents arguing that
... maiority was permitting lawmakers to run roughshod over rights that the
O,Urt had earlier declared inviolable. Thu•, a 195 1 decision finding rhat rhe First
,Aondmenr did nor protect door-to-door conunercial solicitation led Justice
Jllclc to ask why a salesman hawking subscriptions to the Saturday Evening
Pott should be afforded less constirurional protection than a Jehovah's Witness
0t labor organizer engaged in the door·to-door distribution of handbills. In each
cue, Black alleged, rhe end result o f rcgularion was to " hobble" the free
l:ktulation of "religious or political ideas." 8' When the Court in 1955 upheld
die Federal Lobbying Act, Justice William 0. Douglas wondered why the Court
lilCI only ten years before struck down a seemingly similar Texas law thar
aequired labor organizers to regisrer with rhe State. At lcasr to Douglas, it
~ that boch laws exerted a chilling eUect 011 speech, forcing speakers t()
11e9d cautiously- or else refrain from speaking entirely- for fear of crossing "che
psoiubited line" that divided constirutionally prorcctcd expression from paid
OIPni.ung or lobbying acrivities.31 And when the Court in 1961 upheld the
consmurionality of mandatory union contributions, Black attacked bis fellow
jllllim for seeming to abandon th~ con: prin<:iplc of West Virginia v. Bamettemmcly, that citiu:ns could never be forced ro endorse or subsidize political
speech wirh which they disagreed. 86
In theory, the mid-cenrury Court might have produced a body of doctrine
Illar mt«grated principled commitments to free expression, personal autonomy,
111d egalitarian democracy into a coherent whole. llut this was not to be. All roo
illten, rhe justices asserted the constirutionality of measures char seemed likely
llO mitigate the effects of entrenched inequality withour offering clear
explanations of how particular policies mighr be reconciled with an expansive
conceptron of personal autonomy or the idea I of an unfrttercd marketplace of
idea~. On other occasions, the justices fractured into competing camps based
llOWld irreconcilable theories concerning the relationship between civil liberties
"' lltt&nJ •.Alexandria, H• U.S. 611, 6so (•" r). Bbck,J., W...Oung.
•• U.S.'· 1-1.un>s, l47 U.S. 611, 631 (•9HI· Dooglu,J., <L.seotwg.
" ~L. dou.btied that unions were ap1.1blc of m2inu1ning SttKlly ttpa.ra1c acx:oums for politic."UI
IAd col&cco"e batgaining .ai;rivitics.. Jn :tll liltdihood, he rtaSOMd, c.bc obj«ring cmploytt would
l'Kcwe only few penn_1cs on rhc dQllu- an amount that mi&J'it or might not rcfkct the true t'xtent
of the umon·s poliocal ;activities. MnnwhiJc, the employee would remain officially af6Jiattd
•1th :in organi-iation whose aims he despistd. The union sccunty a.grttmmt thus violated ...,
nwn'11 C()nstnutional right to be wholly frtt from 11ny sort governmental cotnpulsion in rhe
ticprC")SIOn o( opinion.._ ... International Association of Machinists v. Street~ 367 U.S. 7-401 197
(1961). Bladc,J., dissenting.
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and the regulatory state. As a result, the rights revolution bequea:hed a troubled
legacy, leaving ~hind a body of law that was plagued by inremal tensions and,
when wielded by justices ot a ditterent ideological stnpe, easily rumed agalll.St its
original normative commitments.
MODERN CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE AGE O F INCOH ERENCE

Richard Nixon's viaory in the presidential elcaion of 1968 marke:! the beginning
of the end of the rights revolucion. With the nation gripped by urban riots and antiwar protests, Nixon blamed the Court- and its civil liberties ruling1 in particular for fo>tcring a general spirit of lawlessness. Nixon's fellow Republican, Ronald
Reagan, who was elected president in 1980, directed similar co1nplaints at the
Court. By the early r98os, the rise of the Christian Right had expanded the list of
conservative grievances. In addition to attacking the Courr's record on "law and
order" quesrions, Reag;m and other prominent Republicans now promised to
appoint justices who would roll back m:cnt rulings on school prayer, abortion,
and pomography.
RepublicaJIS would win six of seven presidential contests berween 1968 and
1988. Control of rhe White House provided Republican Pres denrs with an
opportunity to ·emake the Coun in their party's image, much as FDR and the
Dcmocr11ts had done in the late 19JOS and early 194os.17 The emergence in the
19705 of a conservarive legal movemem provided the intellccrual foundation for
this effon. 81 Many of the movement's early leaders, including Rohen Bork and
Edwin Meese, attacked the Warren Coun for 1gnonng the ongmal intenr (or
meaning) of the Constitution's text - noting, for example, that the phrase "right
to privacy" appears nowhere in the documem. Others foresaw that Warren-era
civil libcrries principles might be applied to conservative ends, such as
weakeni ng corporate transparency laws and rolling back ca mpa ign finance
regulations. As corporate attorney and future Supreme Coun justice Lewis
Powell explained in an inllue111ial 1971 memo, reformers on the left had long
ago learned that an "activist Court" was potentia lly "the most importam
instrumcni [in our constitutional system) for social, economic and political
change.• It was high time that the nation's corporations applied this lesson in
defense of "the free enrerprise system. " 89

•l'

Bqpnrung wuh 1\i:iron•s 1969 nomin:arion of Warrm Burger to rcplxc: F..o1rf W:1rrm as Cliiel
rm consecutive vxancin on rhc: \,.()an.
" Th< OfWn> ol 1ht ""'1S<n1DV< kpl mcmmmt""' cfuam<d m
M. Tcl:s, TINr Riu ofthe
~t""' l..;•I Mex""'"''' The Batt/, for Conlrol of th. l..dru (Pri.-=nn, Prin=on
Unh·trAlf Psu~ 1011); Amanda Hollis~Brusky, ltlni.s with Conuqunras: The Federalist
Soat.ry 11"'11b1 Consnvatii~ CoNnlnrevolMJion {NC'w York: Oxford Univrn.'ity Press, 201st;
J~ Rcpubhan Prcsidrnts would fill

s....,.

Ken L Ktrsch, • Ecumen~aJjsm through Constitutionalmn: The l>iscursivt- De..·dop-ment of
Constirutional Co1iservallsm in National Reu;eu1, 1955-1980, .. S1udi~s ;,, American Political
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is {1011): 86-116.

'" The Powell Memo can be read online at: hup:lllaw1.wlu.cdu/dcpcimagcs/Powell%10Archives
/PowcllMcmorondumTypcsc.ripc.pdf.
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rifying and confirming judicial nominees willing ro undo .th~ War~en
'• legacy proved more difficult than expected. Yer, begmnmg w1.th
's 1969 nomination of Warren Burger to replace Earl Warren as Chief
rhc arril'lll of a series of Republican appoinrces began to transform the
·~ideological orientation. By the 198os, the Court was beginning to steer
·tunonal doo.ttine in directions that componcd with key Reptblican policy
_ from wL-akeniog che regulatory state to rC<>conng authoril! to state and
governments to restricting access to abortion. But j.ust is the ri~ts
ution did nor sweep away everything that came before u, the Republican
ancy did rot bring about the complete dissoh~tion. of Wa~ren-e~a. civil
·cs doctrine. Instead, it ushered in a period of bitter 1dcolo@1cal d1v1s1on,
the justices clearly divided into "conservative" a?d "liberal" blocs ..If the
rvativc bloc has preva iled more often than the liberal, mrernal d1v1s1ons
within the conservative ranks have nonetheless foredosed the possibility of a
ro the constitutional arrangements of the nineteenth century. And,
conservative members of the Burger ( 1969- 1986), Rehnquist (r986aoos>.'and Roberrs (:z.00 5-) Courts have at time~ openly embraced ~a~ren·era
ciW hbe"ies doctrines, even as they ha•c exploited that frameworks mtemal
9111ion~ and app ied its core principles to radically new ends.
. .
.
At the risk of oversimplification, it is possible to trace three d1sttnct lines of
lkftlopment in che Rehnquist and Robcru Couns' major civil liberties
decision~. The first consistS of the surprismgly small number of areas where
..... C'A>un has sutccssfully rolled back - or at leasr limited the influence of Warren-era civil liberties principles. The second consists of the surprisingly
llqpe number of cases where the Court, amng very much. in che spirit of the
lights rcvolurion, has extended •peech and privacy protccnons to ~over novel
suations and previously marginalized groups of Americans. The :bird consists
oE cases where th~ Court has advanced conscrvarivc policy goals not by rolling
blck Warren-era protections but by using innovntivc interpretations of civil
liberties provisions to dismantle the previous regime's handiwork.
As an example of the first line of cases, consider the Rehnquist and Roberts
Court>' rulings in the area of ch11rch~tate relations. Beginning in the early 198os,
die Coun rejected Establishment ClaU>C challenges to a series of scate and local
pn>l!l"ams that indirectly funded religious activities; examples inckded state taX
wrirc-offs for religious educational expend1rures and school voucher programs
dult offset the c~t of attending parochial i.choob.9° Although th= programs
dearly nccrcd public funds to religious entities, a bare majoriry of the Cou"
NISOncd that any aid to religion resulted from the voluntary decisions of private
Clliuns and thus did ooc constitute an official "cstahli<Jimcnt" of religion.
V-cd collccrively, these decisions dearly eroded rhc Warren-era "wall of
1epara11on." At no point, however, did the Coon's conservacivc majority
dittcriy repudiate the landmark mid-century church-state prtttdents. Rather, it
.,. Muelk:r v. Allen, 463 U.S. 31'lJ (19l'3J; 7..clman v. Simmons·! tarrls, SJb U.S. 6;9 (2001).
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proceeded by building upon or reinforcing ducttinal ve>tigc> v( 1hc old order that
had survived the "righis revolution" intact.
The Court's 1970 ruling in Walz v. Tax Commission proved particularly
useful in this regard. If tax exemptions for rclogiou~ institutions did not run
afoul of the F.stablishment Clause, the argument went, then why should similar
exemptions for intl1vrduals pose First Amendment problems? Had noc Walt
definitively rejected the strict scparationist position "that any program which in
some manner aids an instimtion with a religious affiliation violares the
Establishment Clause"?" Moreover, the amount of money that flowed to
religious entities as the indirect result of individual cax write-offs and school
voucher programs paled in comparison to the financia l windfall bestowed by
the \Volz decision. Seen in this light, the newer programs were not "atypical of
existing govemmem programs" that had survived even Justice Hugo Black's

exacting scruriny.!i'~
Jn the case of abortion, the Court has mostly stayed above the fray, leaving stare
and lower federal COurtS ro sort out the question of whether particular forms of
regulation are so onerous as to violare a woman's right to rc""inate a prcgnancy.9 '
As a r:csult, a patdiworl< system of regulation h.,, emerged, with access to abortion
servi= varying widely from state to State. In jurisdictions where the lower COUrtS
have upheld innovati•e restrictions - from rwenry·four-hour waiting periods to
mandatory sonogram procedures 10 laws requiring that abortion providers ha•-c
admitting privileges at a nearby hospital -it has become difficult, if nor impossible,
for women ro avail themselves of the constitutional right to terminare a pregnancy
in its early stages. But while some pushback was certainly to be expected in lighc of
the Republican party's >raunch opposition to abortion, the movement to restrict
access could hardly have proceeded so smoothly absent the Roe majority's decision
to ( 1) frame the issue in the language of medical privacy and (1) adopt a balancing
approach to health and safety regulacious. Like che landmark mid-ceurury
Establislunenc Clause decisions, in other words, Roe left in place significant
vestiges of the rraditional regulatory structure, which in tum provided abortion
oppont-nrs with convenient launching points for anacks on the underlying
constitutional right. 94
•• M..tkt w. Alkn,

•'J U.5 388,n'191 (1983).

•• .Ulman'- ~unmom-Huns,
U.S. 639, '65. 668 (•001). O'Connor, J., concurring.
"' lbt rmf(W'tXcqKM>n 11 GO#'Uk:s v. C.arban-.1n whKh a bare nu,onryo( the Coun uphdd a statt
ban°" p1r11•l·l»nh abomons. sso U.5. t 4 (J.0071.
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Stpuftc.antly. rhr Coun It June l.Ot6 in\-":11.ic:bt:rd~ hr a vote of

s-J· I Tex.as bw ttquiring that

docron prrfcw-ming aborrons have admitting pri,'ilegcs at nearby hoq:>tu.ls and also that aboruon pm~c" undcrf.akc :osrl)' upgrades to their existing lxalma:. Opponmts of the measure
observed thac more ch2n ialf of the state's abortion dini~ had dUk'd within two feari of the
law'$ pa ..u..ge, leaving 50rnc Texas rn:idents as much as soo nulC'$ from tht nearest aboction
pro"·ickr. A mijoriry of tht Coun, in an opinion by Ju~tioe .6reyer, found thal lhe medjcal benefits

of t.hc 1.•hallcngcd prO\!isions, if any, were uol outwei&hed by the burdens imposed on women
&«kin" abortiomi. It rema ns undt'ar, however, whether the decision s1gnal.s a btoader shift away
fto.m th• Court'" ttet>nt pt>tctice o( de(e.rtiug to n:ne lawm11ktn and thf' low~r rouru Wholl"
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Ill• second line of cases, che c.Aurt has carried on the legac_y of the. Warren
embracing boch the doctnnal substance and normative spmt of the
' rk 196os civil libertit-s decisions. Some of rht resulring decisions
bly comport with conservative policy preferences. For example, in the
1990s, ac a time wbeu many conservatives were abrmed by the rise of
s spttch codes, the Court found that the First Amendment generally
udts the criminalization of hate speech, abscnr a ;pecilic thrcac ro an
ri6able individual." Other decisions, however, have cut against the
rvative grain. Thus, the Court bas recently srruck down a number of
~ and federal laws designed
restrict access ro viole~~ or pornographic
lllCfia concent and video games.• And, perhaps most surpnsmgly, the Court Ill
1,t11vrmce v. Texas (2003) struck down a state-level criminal ban on sodomy,
tlllll extending the right to privacy to cover same-sex inrimacy.9 7
At the level of doctrine, these decisions are firmly roo:ed in the great mid·
llDIUTY free spttch and privacy precedents. B111 d0ctrine alone cannot explain
w1iy rhe Court, in these particular ca.cs, elected to adv~nce the legacy of the
risbn revolution. A fuller expl"":auon would ~ by noung ~t many of these
_ . , 10 conrra<r to the abortton and church-stare cases, involve fo""s of
,...Urory authority that were thoroughly discredited during the heyday of the
Wancn Court. In che case of free spcxch, three decades of First Ameodmeot
~ insisting upon the viewpoint neutrality of sptteh regulations had by the
. . . nf rh~ C.ourt's rightward shih effectively stripped stares and localities of the
tbiliry 10 discriminate for or againsc particular speakers, even when the speakers
or ideas in question are reviled by mainstream society.98 To be sure, obscene
lpeech remained theoretically beyond the scope of First Amendment protection,
llul this category had been narrowed almosc to oblivion: works that did not
depict explicit sexual acts or that possessed some semblance of " literary, artistic,
political or sciemific value" were by the late 1970s beyond the reach of the
mison.99 Any artempt to revive the govermnent's traditional role in policing
public discouri>e would have involved far more than ovenuming a single
wayward precedent; it would have meant uprooting a doctrinal framework
diat had been conscructcd over several decades and char appeared co enjoy

:o

1ll'C>1Nn°s H..lrhv. Hdkr=dt, 579U.S.
(101'1; .MaiyTwou, "Only £11luOinics Exp«tt<I
to Sum¥< Rurmg,•Th. Alutin CbTOnick, Junt u., 101 s•
., R.A.V. v. Ciry C)f 5<. P•ul, 505 U.5, J77 (1991); abo ttt V1111n1• •. Block, 538 U.S. HJ ( •oo,).

.. lltno v. Am<rian C.MI Libcni<s Union, su U.S. 844 ( 1997); A•hcrol< v. Frtt Spttch Coalition,
!)l U.S.114 (1001l;Asbcro& v. Arueri<aoOvd J 1bcni<S Union, 511IL~. 656(?.004); Brown•·
Entcrtaanment Merchants Association, s64 U.S._ (1011); Unirtd Stnn v. Stevens, ss9 U.S.
(1010).

" Uwrtnce v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (1003).
,. Tha11 po1nf was driven home by the Seventh Circuit'!! 1 sn8 <lecisioo upholdjng rht right of
Amtriain Nail Parcy members to m3rch through t.hc heavily Jewish t ndave of Skokte, Illinois.
('..(')llin "· Smirh, J78 F.'ld n 97 (r978).
" Milici "· C:.lifo111i-., 1 •;,; U.S. 1) ( 1'l!J); Jcnl...i.1u "· Ocvtg.i"• 4 t8 U.S ISJ (I,74}.
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broad public support - at least in che abstract. In this area, where doctrinal
vestiges were few and far berween, even the Court's most conservative members
have generally embraced the inherited framework, and even in the most
conrroversia I of cases. ' 00
To be sure, the Rehnquist Court narrowly affirmed the conscirucionality of
state-level sodomy bans as late as 1986. Bur the more important point to note
about the Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick is that a generally conservative
Court c.1me within a single vote of extending constitutional protection to samesex intimacy at a time when many in the Republican party viewed homosexuality
as a dire 1hrcnt to the moral and physical health of the nation. ' 0 ' The 5-4
decision, with two Republic.1n appoimees in 1he majority a nd a third only
narrowly dissuaded from joining them, testified to the difficulty of reconciling
sodomy prosecutions with the major privacy precedents of the 1960s and
r97os. ' 0 " If the Court's earlier rulings had fo und that private, consensual,
noncommercial sexual conduct was generally beyond the reach of the state, it
was difficult to see why homosexual conduct should be excluded from the scope
of the rule. Moreover, by the r98os, it was clear tha1 laws prohibiting sodomy,
like the earlier bani. on contraception, were enforced only rarely and often in an
arbitrary and vindictive man.nt"r. ' 0 3 As in Crirwold, a strong case could be made
tha1 desuetude principles alone provided sufficient grounds for an opinion
invalidating the nation's anti-sodomy laws.'"" That Bowers was overruled only
scvenreen years after it was handed down was due in no small part 10 the cffons
of the many acrivisis who, in the intervening years, buih a constirutioo.al case for
rever~I and cultivated public support for decriminalizarion.' 0 ' But it surely does
these acrivim no disservice to suggesr that rhey were aided by the gradual
erosion, over the preceding four decades, o f the states' powers of morals police.

•i»

Jn Ashcroft v. Pree Speech Coalition, for example, the C..:ourt s1n.1ck down pcovisious o( the
ChiJJ 1,ornogNphy t>~vcution At:t o{ l 996 (Cl1JlAt that prohibited '"any visual depicdon,
including any phocoivap~ 61nlt video, picture, or computer or oompmcr-gener.ned image or
picture• that .. i,, or appta.tS to bt, of a minor engaging in Stxually explicit conduct."' The Court

found 1ha1 the language was overbtoad and would pocenri1illy apply to wortcs of "'serious
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lur it is the third line of cases that is perhaps the most interesting. In cases
g corporate speakers, rhe Burger, Rehnquist, and RobertS Courts have
iastically embraoed the ideals of unfettered public discourse and personal
> that undergirded so much of the mid-century Court's civil liberties
nee. But instead of wielding rbcsc ideals in the sernce of a m<)rc
an society, i1 has used them to dismantle key features of the regulatory
• The first signs of a shift came in Virginia Sl4te Board of Pharmacy v.
Citizens Consumer Co,.ncil (1976), when the Court extended First
ment protection to commercial speech. Lf one purpose of the First
ment was to promote rhe "societa l interest in the fullest possible
ination of information," then the Court could sec no reason why
kers should be stripped of constitutional protectiori merely because the
rrnation they hoped to convey was commercial in nature. ' °" On this point,
Court's remaining liberals agreed with the recent Republican appointees: the
· -ccnrury Court had erred when it permitted lawmakers tO restrict speech
yon the basis of ics commercial contcn1.
Sharp disagreements arose, however, when the Court began ro consider the
extent of corporate and commercial First Amendment rights. At bottom,
*rift concerned the relationship between civil liberties and c-conomic power.
.. ca~ involving corporate speakers, the Court's conservative justic.es rended
• ircat the: marketplace and autonomy ideals as absrracr commands: more
lflCCh was always better than less, regardless of who was speaking; and
.-reed spccch was always consriruriooally problcmaric, even when the carger
tlfcotrc1on was a corporation and even when 1hc: information in question was
4'monstrably crue. In contrast, the Court's liberals 1ended 10 adhere to the
Warttn-era view that civil liberties principles were nor to be interpreted in ways
. ., reinforced structural Oa ws in the narion's representative system of
pernment.
In Fim Nalional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti ( 1978), for example, a bare majority
GlllliSting entirely of Republican appointees Struck down a Massachusetts law
. ., banned corporations from attempring to influence ballot initiatives "unless
*corporation's business interests were directly involved." Relying heavily on the
-itcrplace metaphor, justice Lewis Powell's majority opinion declared that "the
illicttnt worth of ... spctth in terms of its capacity for informing the public" was
-'kctcd by "the identify of its source, whether corporation, association, union,
ar indn idual. """ In contrast, three Democratic appointees and William
llbnquist, a Nixon appointee, would h3'e held th.u the law was a permissible

pease
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... <'.tntt•l Hudson Gas & Electric v. Pubfo: Sttv1cc Commission, .,..... , U.S. ;57, 56.i (1980).
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means of preventing corporations from dominaring the airwavc'S and directing
shareholder mor>ey to political causes that were only tangcntiaUy related to th.,
corporation's bottom line. Far from distoning public discourse, Massachusetts
was attempting to preserve the historic "role of the Hrst Amendment as a
guaranror of a fr« marketplace of ideas."'""
Although the Bellott; majority found that the First Amendmem protected the
right of corporations tu influence elections, the precise scope of chis right was
left undefined. Some language in the opinion suggested that regulations
narrowly targeted at the avoidance of corruption (or irs appearance) would
survive first Amendment scrutiny. And a subsequent 1990 decision upheld a
state law thar barred corporations from using treasury funds (as opposed to
political action committee funds) for political purposes. •09 As a result, an
uneasy truce held for the next three decades. Under the federal Election
Campaign Act and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BC RA), the size of
direct contr ibutions to candidates, parties, and political action committees was
limited, and corporate and union expenditures were channeled through
political action committees. Independent expenditures were also subject to
rules designed to prevent corporations and unions from circumventing
contribution limits by cutting ads on behalf of specific candidates.
The mice collapsed in 1oo6, however, following the death of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the retirement of Sandra Day O'Connor. Following the
confirmation of John Roberts and Samuel Aliro, respectively, to fill the
resulring vacancies, it became clear that a bare majority of the Coun now
favored dismantling m<>St remaining restriction.• on corporate electoral activity.
The moot signilic:int blow to the campaign finance regime came in 1010, when a
bare majority held in Citizens United v. Federal f./ections Commission that the
First Amendment protects the right of corporations t0 spend unlimited amounts
from their corporate treasuries to influence campaigns, provided they do not
coordinate their expenditures with a particular candidate. " 0 As in Bellotti, the
marketplace metaphor ttndergirded much of the majority opinion. According to
Justice Kennedy, laws restricting political spending by corporations dismrtcd the
ideological marketplace by depriving average Americans of information they
might want or need to bear. To be sure, corporarions possessed the capacity ro
dominate the airwa»cs in ways that average citiuns could never hope to match.
l\ut 1~1s fact was irrel~ant sit11;e, 1mder the marketplace theory, the public could
be counted on t0 i.cp;tratt the wheat from the chaff.'''

°' ibid. it 810- Whnt. j .• chssenung.
°' Autnn v. Mteh.pn Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 651. (1990).
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II I

ss•

U.S. 3 ro It - (2010). '"'By suppressing chc 'ipe«h of . •. C0'1'0rlt1C'.>M, .. Kennedy wroce.
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ptrmining rhcm :all tn .speak1 and by entrusting the people rC> judge wh1u is trut and what is
f:alsc.'" A subM:qucnt lower court decision, folJowing Citiuns U11i1ed tO its logic11J conclusion,
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1be impact of the Court's corporate speech dcci,ions was not confined to the
of campaign finance. Following Virginia Board and Bell-01ti, the number of
Amendment challenges co corporate transparency and disclosure laws
eml - as did the odds of success. In recent years, roughly half of all
Amendment decisions handed down at the federal appellate level have
ed business corporations and trade groups a~ opposed to individuals and
· 'onal exprcssi»c assodations. •u More to the point, the resulting decisioos
cut to the very core of the regulatory sratt. To list but a few exampks,
tions have successfully advanced First Amendment speech challenges to
prohibiting the buying and selling, without consent, of patient prescription
by data mining and pharmaceutical companies,''> regulations requiring that
kh claims used to market food products be supported by at least
randomly comrolled trial srudies,',. regulations requiring companies to
osc their use of "conflict minerals,""' and regulations requiring t0bacco
tlJlllpanies to display graphic warning lahcl• on packs of cigarettes. " 6
The autonomy principle and the corollary prohibition against compelled speech
liPe proved particularly useful in chis reg.1rd. In its opinion upholding the right o f
..i-xo companies to refuse to incl ode graphic warning labels on their products, for
.-nplc, the D.C. Circuit held that "any am.-mpc by the government to compel
lldMduals to . . . subsidize speoch to which they object" was subject to stria
lllU!iny. 1lns rule applied e.-en when the speech an qucstioo invol,.ed "statements
fll fa..i the speaker would rather a,·oid" and regardless of whether the speakers in
~ were individuals or corporanons.'" A bare maionty of the Supmne Court
mdoncd a similar argument in Harris v. Q1111111 (1014), a potentially far-reaching
41ecision mva~dating a "fair share" agreement that required publicly subsidi7,ed
lionic health care workers to contribute to the costs of union representation. " 8
Jreaking with a long line of precedent that include-cl T11t<'T1Mtumal Associa!ion of
"#IM*inis~ v. Street, the Tlarris majority found lhal, although the collective
t-rgaining system in question furthered legirimate state interests, these interei.'ts
_.. not sufficient to overcome the Firsr Amc11dmcnt rights of employ<"<"S who
objected to paying union d ues. To hold otherwi!>C would be to violate the principle
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prottt"l1 tbt nght or ITil('fHI groups and political acrion
amounts oi monty, PfO"tdcd. agam, that rhcy do nor c.oordirur.r
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that the government "may not prohibit the dis5eminarion of ideas that it disfavors,
nor compel the endorsement of ideas that it approves."' "
In decisions such as Virginia Board, Citizens Uniud, and I lams v. Quinn, the
rcconsriruted Court has dealt a series of signilicanr blows to the rcgularory stare,
but nOt by challenging its authority head-on. Rather, rhe Coun's conscrvati~
majority has conceded the legitimacy of the underlying power (e.g., to regulate
campaign finance, to m3lldate corporate transparr-ncy, to impose collective
bargaining arrangements}, only to rendeL regulation impractical through an
expansive inrcrpn:tation of the First Amendment rights of individuals and
corporations. Adding to the irony, it has done so using the very doctrines that
the mid-century Court used to dismantle the various state and local prerogatives
that had long relega1ed workers and minori1ies to a subordinate position in
American society. To be sure, as Justice Aliro acknowledged in his o pinion for
rhe Harris majority, previous Courts had repeatedly rebuffed first Amendment
challenges tO the regulatory state. But these ea rl ier precedents were not binding
upon rhe prese111 Court, Alico insisted, as they were the "result of historical
accident, not careful application of principles." ' 10

CONCLUSION

This last remark from J usticc Alito, with its juxraposirion of "principles" and
"historical accidems," might well serve as the epitaph for the past cenrury of
constirurional development in the area of civil liberties. Since at least the New
Deal period, it has been the aspiration of judges and commentators alike to
liberate citi.ccns from arbitrary authority strucnires bequeathed by their
forebears. During this period, constitutiona l interpreters have generally
agreed thnt if official authority is co survive constitutional scrutiny, it should
not be because of the judge's irrational prejudice in fovor of the familiar but
rather because the rights claimant has misunderstood o r missta ted the nature of
the principle at stake - whether the freedom of speech, the freedom of religion,
or the right to privacy. The problem - and the explanation for much of the
incoherence of recent civil liberties doctrine - is rhat the distinction between a
"historical accident" and a proper "application of principles• often lies in the
eye of the beholder.

"' !71 U.S.
(>014). Althoogh 1hc sp<alic boldU1gol HllmS w.u rwrowly wxned al Illinois'
ugulition of home he-aIth care worlcC1"5, the <kc:rseon Sttmtd to SJgtU.I the Coun's willingness to
tt00m1<.kr the broader quc:Won of compelkd union dutt. And, 1ndttd. the Court in Marth
101' d1~idc-d 4- '4 on tk question of whether publk sector •agency shop.. provisjoos were m
viola11on o( the Fint Amendment. If not For Justice Scali-;a's unrimdy death iJ1 februacy1016,
the Court almost cettautJy wouJd ha\•c handed down 11 f::tr·rcaching d«.i,ion eviscerating rhc
crntcal Wnrren·tt<l precedents oon<..~ rning unjon dues and the First Amendment. Friedrichs v.
C.1lifornia Teachers Association, 578 U.S. _ (2016).
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Uberties and tbe Dual Legacy of the f:o1111di11g

ros

Iii rhc •ame term that the Court decided 1/orris v. Quinn, it also deci_ded
fell v. Hodges, a landmark decision granting same-sex couples the nght
rry. In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy and the majority found that state laws
limircd the right to marry to opposite-sex couplos were, m effect, historical
rs. Because the laws in question served no purpose other than to register
randing and irrational prejudice against homosexuals, they could only be
ri7.ed as 311 illegitimate denial of "liberty" under the Fourteenth
cot's Due Process Clause. Although "history and tradition" were
inly relevant to the constinitional inquiry, they did not mark the "outer
5• o f constitutional liberry. The past, Kennedy insisted , would not be
[edJ ... to rule the present. "
Now on the opposite side of the " historical accident~ formulation, J ustice
failed to perceive how traditional marriage laws could be characterized as
"trary relics of a bygone era. In a dissent joined by J ustices Scalia and Thomas,
suAAested that rradinonal ma rriage laws served the important purpose of
urag[ingj potentially procreative conduct to take place within a lasnng urut
has long been thought to provide the best atmo>phcrc for raising children."
fer from registering an irrational prejudice, existing laws embodied an inter"'"'
. . . ttgarded as legitimate "in a great variety of countries and cultures all around
globe.• If 311yone was guilty of conflating irrationa I prejudice 3lld contlilurional principle, it was Justice Kennedy and the majority. It was they, not
lawtndkers, who had read into "the Constitution a vision of liberty that
liappcn!e<ll to coincide with their own."
The core disagreement in Obergefel/ cal.ls to mind Walter Lippmann's
wrrung, issued in the late 1910s, that Americans would increasingly find
diemsclvcs unable to justify legal authori ty by reference 10 shared moral or
religious principles. Lippmann was of course referring to the difficulty of
lllforcing traditional legal prohibitions in a world that was growu1g more
morally hercrogeneous by the day. Bur he might just as easily have formulated
die point in the opposite way: with rhe collapse of traditional belief structures,
apan,ively worded constirurional guara ntees - from rhe " freedom of speech" to
die "csrablishment of religion" to "liberty" itself - would be transformed into
highly adaptable tools that could be used to ch311cngc (or buruess) a lmost any
nf authority, whether public or private, national or local, old or new. To be
~ Americans would remain free to invoke tradition as one possible locus of
i.rrprcnve authority, but the interpretive significance of tradition was itself up
for grabs. Whether inherited authority structures furthered legitimate ends or
~ly reflected parochial prejudices - whether ag;iinst gays and lesbians or in
favor of organized labor- would become increasingly a matter of opinion. j udges
end commcntarors, for their part, would be left to search in vain "for a new
orthodoxy into which men can retreat."
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